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Abstract:
This thesis applies international relations theory to better understand the political
maneuvering of states in refugee affairs. It argues that previous contributions to this debate
have used a wrong paradigm to describe burden-sharing politics in the refugee regime,
resulting in models which are too static to capture the high-politics of refugee affairs. In
particular, the thesis criticizes the ‘North vs. South’ model proposed by Betts (2009), which
argues that the burden-sharing politics in the refugee regime can be understood as an
opposition between states in the global ‘North’ and global ‘South’. Where Betts uses the
geographic position of the state to understand burden-sharing politics in the refugee regime,
the essay argues that burden-sharing politics in the refugee regime is based on the geographic
position of the refugee. Using this refugee-centered paradigm as starting point, it then argues
that state maneuvering in the refugee regime should not be described as North vs. South
impasse, but as a zero-sum game between states seeking to evade asylum-burdens and states
seeking to reduce refugee-burdens.
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Introduction
When revolt rocked the Arab world of 2010-11, few expected that the popular uprisings
would result in years of prolonged warfare, hunger, and displacement. Yet instead of
independent citizens, the political upheaval of the Arab Spring has foremost created refugees.
A region-wide breakdown of authority has intensified the long-time role of the Middle East as
a source, transit, and destination region for migrants, forced migrants, and refugees. In Libya,
dictatorship was replaced with anarchy, and tens of thousands of Libyans and migrants were
abused, raped and murdered1. In Yemen, more than 10% of the local population fled a
regional proxy war between Houthis and Sunnis2. The Syrian Civil War has displaced over 12
million Syrians both in- and outside their home country3. Three of Syria’s neighbours each
host almost 2 million refugees on their territory, setting new international records4. By the end
of 2015, 39% of the world’s record-high 65 million displaced persons lived in the Middle East
and North Africa5.
Despite this heavy refugee burden, developed countries have traditionally shown surprisingly
little initiative and limited support for refugee populations and the states hosting them. While
millions of Syrians struggled to make ends meet in Turkey, the entire 515-million strong
European Union welcomed only 51,000 Syrian asylum-seekers in 2013 and 122,790 in 20146.
Official refugee resettlement quotas were less than these spontaneous arrivals7, nor did OECD
financial support allocated to crisis alleviation in the Middle East in any way suffice. UNHCR
felt forced to issue multiple emergency appeals for more funds, warning in June 2015 that its
operations were “so dangerously low on funding that we risk not being able to meet even the

1

McVeigh, K. (2017). Refugee women and children 'beaten, raped and starved in Libyan hellholes'. The
Guardian. As found online at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/feb/28/refugee-women-and-childrenbeaten-raped-and-starved-in-libyan-hellholes
2
UNHCR (2015). Global Trends Report. As found online at:
http://www.unhcr.org/statistics/unhcrstats/576408cd7/unhcr-global-trends-2015.html p.7
3
UNHCR (2015), p. 6
4
Lebanon hosts the largest number of refugees in the world relative to its population (183 refugees per 1000
inhabitants), with Jordan second on the same list (87 refugees per thousand inhabitants). Turkey hosted the
largest refugee population in the world in absolute terms: 2.54 million refugees, most whom are Syrian citizens.
All figures from UNHCR (2015), p. 2
5
UNHCR (2015), p. 2
6
European Migration Network (2015). Eurostat figures show just over 626,000 asylum applicants registered in
the EU-28 in 2014; Syrian nationals represented 20%. As found online at:
http://emn.ie/index.jsp?p=100&n=105&a=2391
7
Orchard, C. and Miller, A. (2014). Protection in Europe for refugees from Syria. As found online at:
http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/pb10-protection-europe-refugees-syria-2014.pdf p. 6
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most basic survival needs of millions of people over the coming six months”.8 Four years into
the Syrian Civil War, the food assistance to 1.6 million refugees was at reduced levels,
750,000 children remained out of school, 86 percent of urban refugees in Jordan lived below
the national poverty line of 3.2 dollars per day, and 45% of refugees in Lebanon lived in
substandard shelters9.
With this background, one might be forgiven for cheering on growing numbers of refugees
who opted to take their fate in their own hands, crossed over the Bosporus and headed for
Berlin. But where this choice of the refugees was easily understood, the political response of
policymakers did not quite fit in the modern academic understanding of refugee regime
politics.
Refugee studies is a young discipline, and international relations theorization of state
maneuvering in the refugee regime is younger still – only really gaining a foothold in
academia since the turn of the century. One particular point of contention in the academic
debate has been the issue of state cooperation in response to refugee crises. How and why do
states formulate their national interest in the refugee regime and defend it on the international
stage? Several studies have sought to describe the interests of states and the limitations to
state cooperation in the refugee regime. Most recently, Alexander Betts has argued in multiple
papers (cf. Betts 2009, 2010a, 2010b) that the refugee regime is facing a geopolitical impasse
between global ‘Northern’ countries and global ‘Southern’ countries. This geographic
impasse is the result of four features of the current system: the prevalence of conflict and
human rights-abusing regimes in the global ‘South’, an institutional absence for a binding
legal or normative framework for burden-sharing, the very low interest of Northern states in
contributing to refugee protection for its own sake, and the limited bargaining power of
developing refugee-hosting states in the refugee regime. As a result of the ‘North-South’
impasse, developed countries have the upper hand in control of the refugee regime, while
developing nations hosting refugees have had little option other than to accept all ‘Northern’
offers that are on the table.

8

Dobbs, L. (2015). Funding shortage leaves Syrian refugees in danger of missing vital support. As found online
at: http://www.unhcr.org/news/latest/2015/6/558acbbc6/funding-shortage-leaves-syrian-refugees-dangermissing-vital-support.html
9
idem.
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However enticing this explanation may sound on paper, a North-South description does not
quite line up with the political maneuvering put on display during the EU-Turkey refugee
crisis. The global ‘North’ did not act unilaterally in response to the crisis, but squabbled
amongst themselves. Hungarian Prime Minister Victor Orban exclaimed that Europe’s very
existence was under threat10. Germany’s Angela Merkel welcomed refugees with the phrase:
“Wir Schaffen Dass”11. Austria and Hungary argued with Germany about who should host
refugees, various Eastern European countries blocked an attempt by the European
Commission to spread the refugee inflow amongst the member-states of the EU, and the
normally liberal government of Sweden closed its borders to further refugee inflows once it
feared that its government services were being overwhelmed. In the negotiations which
would eventually lead to the March 2016 EU-Turkey ‘deal’, not a stronger ‘Northern’ country
but a weaker ‘Southern’ country had the upper hand. Turkey’s negotiators demanded
unprecedented and previously unthinkable financial and political support in exchange for their
cooperation to the EU’s plans and they received what they requested12.
In the traditional parlance of international relations and refugee studies, the build-up to the
crisis had confirmed the theoretical notion of ‘Northern’ ignorance. Child labour, and vivid
depictions on the despair of millions on its borders had barely registered with ‘Northern’
central decision-makers, and their support had clearly been limited. However, once refugee
onward movement intensified, the European Union had been thrown into a crisis that in no
way lined up with the predicted ‘Northern’ upper hand over its ‘Southern’ neighbours.
The inconsistencies between the theory of the North-South impasse and the practical reality
visible in the EU-Turkey refugee crisis are reason for this essay to take another critical look at
the description of refugee regime politics in terms of a ‘North’ vs. ‘South’ geography. This
thesis asks the following research question: does the existing evidence support Alexander
Bett’s description of state maneuvering in the refugee regime as stuck in a geographic NorthSouth impasse?

10

https://www.wsj.com/articles/europes-existence-threatened-by-influx-of-migrants-says-hungarys-orban1437827281
11
http://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/angela-merkels-sommerpressekonferenz-13778484.html
12
European Commission (2015). EU support in response to the Syrian crisis. As found online at:
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-16-222_en.htm
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The following pages hypothesize that the North-South impasse fails to explain the available
quantitative and qualitative evidence about state maneuvering in the refugee regime, because
it uses a paradigm mistake: rather than construct state politics in the refugee regime based on
the geographic position of the state, politics in the refugee regime would be more accurately
described based using the geographic position of the refugee as point of reference.
To investigate this research question and hypothesis, the thesis first lays out the basic
international relations theory used to describe the need for international cooperation and the
way in which the international system structures cooperation in an anarchic environment.
Section two then reviews the international relations literature on the refugee regime,
culminating in a description and critique of Alexander Betts’ argument that the refugee
regime is stuck in a ‘North vs. South impasse’. Building on this critique, section three
develops an alternative explanation of politics in the refugee regime which takes as its starting
point that not the location of states but the location of refugees is decisive for the strategic
decisions made by states when maneuvering in the refugee regime.

8

1. An International Relations Perspective of the
Refugee Regime
Until quite recently, refugee and migration scholars paid surprisingly little attention to the role
of the state in the refugee regime. While detailed legal and sociological analyses of forced
migration exist, similar critical studies of the philosophy, international relations, and political
sociology of the refugee regime remain relatively scarce13. Until very recently, even refugee
scholars themselves admitted that this resulted in a limited understanding amongst refugee
scholars of how they might most effectively influence decisions made in the refugee regime.
As Landau (2007) noted:
“Without a more nuanced understanding of the incentives, limitations, and ambitions
of state, UN agencies, and other actors, we limit our ability to constructively engage
them and address the economic, social, and political processes we decry”14
This first section therefore explains why states have an incentive to establish and participate
in an international refugee regime, and offers a brief overview of the existing refugee regime.

A. States, the Problem of Collective Action and the
Theory of Public Goods
Any discussion on the politics of the refugee regime is bound to start with the most
fundamental concept of international relations: the state. The state is the core entity around
which most modern migration governance is built, and the institution which most defines the
experience of the modern migrant.
The modern state is a social construct, originally developed to end 125 years of religious
warfare in mid-17th century Europe15. The defining feature of the state is its exclusive right to
use legitimate violence in the territory under its control. This monopoly of legitimate violence
helps the state apparatus guarantee its sovereignty over the territorial bounds of its country16.

13

Landau (2007), p. 342
Landau (2007), p. 345
15
Biersteker, T. and Weber C. (1996). State Sovereignty as Social Construct. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press
16
cf. Weber (1919). The Westphalian definition of state sovereignty differs from its predecessors in that the
latter mostly proposed that sovereignty was diffusely held by earthly as well as religious rulers. Think, in Middle
14
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European empire exported this conceptualization of the state and state sovereignty to the rest
of the world from the 18th to the early 20th centuries. While the two World Wars did much to
diminish European power, European ideas remained. The United Nations (UN), set up in
1945 to prevent a third great war, institutionalized the principle that all states are sovereign
over their domestic affairs and that there should be ‘sovereign equality’ between states17. It
was with these principles that decolonization occurred and dozens of new states would appear
in the thirty years between 1945 and 1975 – making Westphalian sovereignty a global norm.
While the absolute sovereignty of the state allows for the maintenance of order within state
boundaries, a principle of ‘sovereign equality’ also complicates the governance of affairs
affect more than one state – i.e. international affairs. When all states are equal, there is no
clear procedure to regulate conflicts between states. Under true equality, states cannot be
forced to cooperate. The Westphalian international state system has therefore often been
described as existing in a state of ‘anarchy’18. However, even sovereign states can be
convinced that cooperation is in their best interest.
i. The Theory of Public Goods
International Relations scholars have sought to describe when, why and how equally
sovereign states cooperate on trans-national issues, and when they prefer to ‘go it alone’. An
extensive literature has developed, analyzing international cooperation in areas like economic
globalization, world trade, and environmental regulation.
Most analyses of international cooperation find their theoretic foundation in the
microeconomic theory of public goods. The theory of public goods, first developed by Paul
Samuelson (1954) and Morton Olson (1965), argues that some goods require an investment to
be produced, but once created can be consumed by all persons at no additional marginal cost.
The most important cost to attain the benefit are therefore the costs of the initial investment.
Examples of such goods include roads, national defense, radio, street lighting, or clean air.

East of the construction of legitimacy through the Caliph to the Sultan, in medieval Europe with the rivalry on
temporal power between kings and popes
17
United Nations (1945). Charter of the United Nations. As found online at: http://www.un.org/en/sections/uncharter/chapter-i/. Chapter 1, Article 2.
18
Waltz, K. (1979). Theory of International Politics. New York: Random House; Wendt, A. (1992). Anarchy is
What States Make of It: International Organization, Vol. 46, No. 2, pp. 391-425

10

In some cases, outsider access to these goods can be limited. For example, access to roads can
be limited using toll booths. However, in other cases, access cannot be limited and the good once produced - becomes part of the public domain. For example, I cannot limit my neighbor
from enjoying cleaner air even if I am the only person who has reduced the excretion of
pollutants and my neighbor has not contributed.
Goods which can be used without being consumed, and to which access cannot be restricted,
are known as public goods. They stand in contrast to three other types of goods: private
goods, club goods, and common-interest goods.
Excludable:

Not Excludable:

(access can limited)

(access cannot be limited)

Rivalrous:

Private Good

Common-Interest Good

(can only be consumed once)

e.g. car, cake

e.g. fishing stocks

Non-Rivalrous:

Club Good

Public Good

(consumption does not

e.g. toll highways

e.g. clean air, radio waves

diminish supply)

Public goods theory argues that actors have a rational incentive to make other people produce
the public goods which they use. After all, the greatest benefit of each actor occurs if only the
other actor invests to realize the desired benefit. The actor who does not invest can then enjoy
consumption of a benefit without having to lift so much as a finger. This attempt to minimize
the cost of producing a public good while still enjoying its benefits is known as ‘free-riding’.
As all actors share the same incentive, the end-result is a stalemate which both actors worse
off because a sub-optimal allocation of investment and a likewise sub-optimal outcome of
public goods (0,0) occurs (see below). This rational unwillingness of actors to work together
to achieve a greater good is known as the “problem of collective action”19.

19

Olson Jr., M. (1965). The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups. Harvard:
Harvard University Press
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Actor 1:

Does not Produce the

Produces the Public Good

Public Good
Produces the Public Good
Actor 2:

Actor 1:

2

Actor 1:

1.5

Actor 2:

1

Actor 2:

1.5

Does not Produce the

Actor 1:

0

Actor 1:

1

Public Good

Actor 2:

0

Actor 2:

2

Free-ridership of public goods is a particularly notable problem in an anarchic environment,
because there is no authority to impose an equal distribution of burdens and benefits. On the
national level, Westphalian sovereignty ensures that the government can impose the provision
of public goods and enforce burden-sharing amongst actors by punishing free-ridership. Yet
on a global level, states are left without any clear assurance that they will not be ‘cheated’ into
producing a public good while other countries free-ride their efforts. As far back as the late
1970s, a key challenge for international relations scholars has therefore been to identify
conditions under which the problem of collective action can be overcome in an anarchic
international state system.

ii. Public Goods Provision on the Global Level: Game Theory and Regime Theory
The academic debate which sought to understand how rational states might overcome the
problem of collective action in international affairs relied extensively on game theory. Game
theory, developed in the 1940s and 1950s is "the study of mathematical models of conflict and
cooperation between intelligent rational decision-makers"20.
In the late 1970s, international relations scholars applied and evolved game theoretical
principles to develop ‘regime theory’ – a theory which seeks to explain how and what types of
mechanisms states create to overcome collective action problems. Regimes - defined as
“[i]mplicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which
actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international relations”21 – were analysed as
‘intervening variables’ which enabled states (the independent variable) to pursue shared

20
21

Myerson, R. (1991). Game Theory: Analysis of Conflict. Boston: Harvard University Press.
Krasner (1982), p. 2
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policies (the dependent variable)22. The aim of regime theory was to explore the emergence
and effectiveness of regimes; to explain how regimes are negotiated, implemented, monitored,
and enforced23; and to understand how regimes might limit and structure state behavior in
world politics.
Despite much debate, regime theorists have not reached consensus about the exact influence
of regimes on state actions. Initial explanations leaned on neo-realist hegemonic stability
theory (HST), which argued that the hesitation of states to cooperate can be overcome through
coercion by a great power, or hegemon. According to supporters of HST, regimes are an
expression and extension of the hegemon’s power. The stability of global regimes therefore
relies on the hegemon developing and enforcing the rules of the regime. Prominent supporters
of hegemonic stability theory are often linked to the neo-realist school of international
relations, and have included Charles Kindleberger, Robert Gilpin, Stephen Krasner24, Joseph
Grieco25, and Daniel Drezner26.
In opposition to hegemonic stability theory, liberal institutionalists have argued that regimes
can in fact be created and sustained without the presence of a hegemon. While agreeing that
states are likely to defend their own interests, liberal institutionalists argued that regimes are a
prominent tool for any group of states to overcome their mutual distrust because regimes: (i)
provide information about the behavior of other states by monitoring and reporting on
compliance; (ii) reduce the transaction costs associated with state cooperation, and (iii)
generate the expectation of cooperation amongst participating states27.
Some of the most persuasive evidence in support of the liberal institutionalist argument has
been found in regimes where no clear hegemon can be identified. Prominent examples include
22

Young, O. (1980). International Regimes: Problems of Concept Formation. World Politics Vol. 32, pp. 331356.
23
see Krasner, S.D. (1983) Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables. In
International Regimes, ed. by S. D. Krasner. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press; and Hasenclever, Mayer,
Rittberger (1997) Theories of International Regimes. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
24
see Webb, M.C. and Krasner, S.D. (1989). Hegemonic Stability Theory: An Empirical Assessment, Review of
International Studies. Vo. 15, pp. 183–98
25
Grieco, J. (1988). Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal
Institutionalism. International Organization, Vol. 42, No. 3, pp. 485-507
26
Drezner, D. (2007). All Politics is Global: Explaining International Regulatory Regimes. Princeton: Princeton
University Press.
27
Keohane, R. (1984). After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy. Princeton:
Princeton University Press. Also see: Keohane, R.and Martin, L.M. (1995). The Promise of Institutionalist
Theory. International Security. 20/1 pp. 39–51.
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the creation of the European Union in 1992 and the signing of the 1951 Convention Relating
to the Status of Refugees (CSR). In these cases, states sought to ensure reciprocity by
agreeing on common principles, rules, decision-making, and verification mechanisms without
any negotiating state powerful enough to function as a hegemon.

B. The Eradication of International Forced Migration
as a Global Public Good
Over the past quarter-century, the eradication of international migration has become among
the most controversial and hotly-debated global goods. In many ways, the debate on
migration is a natural evolution from the even older discussions on international trade and the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). While the world has achieved a
historically unprecedented integration of trade networks, goods, and financial services
through GATT and WTO negotiations, the same progress has not been made in the movement
of persons (i.e. international migration).

i. A State ‘National’ Interest and Multilateral Cooperation in Forced Migration
To understand why multilateral agreement in migration affairs has remained so elusive, it
helps to consider migration from the perspective of the state.
All international migration regimes are a compromise between considerations of national
sovereignty and individual freedom of movement. While international law gives individuals
the right to leave and return to their country of citizenship, it does not offer a legal right to
enter a foreign country. Freedom of movement between states can therefore effectively be
described as “half a right” – the right to leave, but not to enter.
States have been hesitant to hand over their sovereignty about who enters their territory to an
international institution for ideological and political reasons. Enlightenment social contract
theory, which has since the mid-18th century been enormously influential amongst theorists
and statesmen alike28. In social contract theory, the Westphalian right of the state to a

28

cf. Rousseau (1762). A primary debate in political philosophy is what rights the state should defend through
its monopoly on violence. Outside anarchism (which embraces anarchy on a international and national level),
even minimalist conceptions of the state-citizen relationship allow states to regulate and impose some constraints
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monopoly on legitimate violence (cf. Weber 1919) is only justified in so far as it is done in
line with the defense of the civil, political, economic and social rights of its citizens.
Controlling who can enter or leave a state is considered a primary duty for state authorities in
the protection of the interests of their citizens and constituents.
Besides an ideational justification, political leaders also have a political incentive to retain
some measure of control over their immigration policy. International migration has the
potential to run counter to factional interests within the state. As international migrants arrive
from a different state, they often hold to different beliefs and have a different outlook on the
world. Citizens already living in the receiving state can feel threatened by these different
cultural practices29. Miscommunication and language and culture barriers, especially in
combination with competing economic interests, can quickly lead to social conflict – and can
also fan flames of resistance against the political system.
The potential political risks associated with migration have been reason enough for states to
retain sovereign control over their migration policies. The desire of states to protect the
perceived interests of their political community are placed above the individual right to
freedom of movement30. As a result of this prioritization, most attempts to regulate postWWII international migration through binding multilateral regimes have failed.

ii. Forced Migration and State Interest in a Global Asylum Framework
The few notable exceptions where multilateral cooperation in migration has succeeded have
mostly concerned problems of forced migration. The two most prominent examples are the
protocols on human trafficking and smuggling, attached to the 2000 UN Convention Against
Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC), and the international ‘refugee’ regime, which
provides a global asylum safety net to specific categories of international migrants who were
forced to migrate abroad.
on individual freedom to act (see e.g. Nozick 1983). For nearly all it includes the defense of unwanted intrusions
by persons who are not citizens, including their presence on the state’s soil.
29
The modern Enlightenment vision of the ‘nation’-based citizenship may be accurately described as ‘imagined’
(cf. Anderson 1983), and national identities may justifiably be termed ‘social constructs’ (cf. Fierke 2010), but
states are nonetheless limited in their actions by the belief that they exist to protect the interests of their citizens.
Around the world, a citizen by law has more rights and a broader claim on the protection of the state than a noncitizen. For a solid case-study on how states form and maintain ‘national identity’ and citizenship, see: Mylonas,
H. (2012). The Politics of Nation-Building: Making Co-Nationals, Refugees, and Minorities. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press
30
Juss, S. (2004). Free Movement and the World Order. International Journal on Refugee Law. Volume 16 (3),
p. 289-335; p. 293
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For adherents to Westphalian-Enlightenment social contract theory, cooperation in the fight
against irregular migration is a logically sound choice. The desire of states to control the flow
of foreign persons onto their territory paradoxically also offers a powerful incentive for
international cooperation to counter irregular migration flows. The transnational nature of
these organized attempts to migrate mean that any successful attempt to combat smuggling or
human trafficking will require considerable international cooperation from multiple states.
The provision of a global asylum safety net is even more entangled with the WestphalianEnlightenment conception of state and citizen. As the state, with its monopoly on violence, is
the pillar of order and stability in the Westphalian state system, an inability or unwillingness
of the state to fulfil its duties will inevitably result in citizen insecurity and the repression of
human rights. Insecurity can therefore be an important motivation (push-factor) for people to
migrate in search of alternative sources of protection.
Unfortunately, the ‘half’ right of migration in international law undermines the ability of
oppressed persons to flee state persecution, and can effectively trap them within the confines
of their own state. At the same time, if a person were to flee across a border in an irregular
fashion, an expulsion to their home country would mean their return into the hands of the very
people that were abusing them in the first place.
History offers evidence that forced migrants who are unable to depend on state protection but
cannot flee become more susceptible to alternative offers of protection, including from
guerilla and terrorist groups who undermine international security (Lischer 2005; Juma and
Kagwanja 2008). Even if they do not join such activist movements, forced migrants can
become a barrier to peace-building initiatives in post-conflict situations if they are not
provided with adequate protection and durable solutions (Morris and Stedman 2008; Milner
2009).
To ensure that persons at risk of persecution by their own states are not left to fend for
themselves, and undermine international security in their search for protection, there is
widespread consent in the international community that these persons should to have recourse
to an alternative means of food, shelter, safety, and minimal legal rights. The importance of
providing such a service was already recognized in Article 14 of the 1948 Universal
16

Declaration of Human Rights, which proclaimed that “everyone has the right to seek and
enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution”31.
The surest way to guarantee such alternative means is for the international community to
provide surrogate protection by offering an exceptional right to migrate in search for safety to
another country – i.e. the right to ‘seek asylum’. States which agree to provide asylum to
asylum-seekers help to uphold international justice and simultaneously pre-empt migrant
susceptibility to recruitment by non-state actors, i.e. strengthen international order.

iii. The Problem of Collective Action in the Provision of Global Asylum
Despite widespread agreement that states therefore should provide asylum to people forced to
flee their homes, the provision of international asylum is not a straightforward affair. The
creation of a global asylum safety net is complicated by a classic collective action problem.
States are not automatically willing to take up the role of surrogate protector because
accepting forced migrants also means bearing uncertain financial and social costs. These costs
include short-term financial investments into housing and the provision of services to asylumseekers, but also the difficulties associated with longer-term integration of such migrants including the possibility of social tensions between migrants and host communities.
As the benefits of a global asylum safety net are shared amongst all states, but the burden of
surrogate protection is primarily born by one state, state coordination is necessary to provide a
global asylum safety net. Without such coordination, states have an incentive to ‘free-ride’ on
their responsibilities – to attempt to minimize their asylum burden relative to what they could
provide if they acted collectively. As all states have a same personal interest, uncoordinated
state behavior will quickly lead to an under-provision of international asylum.
The international community will therefore only successfully provide asylum if it establishes
and supports a common set of norms, rules, principles, and decision-making procedures to
clarify their common and shared obligations towards asylum-seekers. The small but growing
body of academic work which analyses surrogate state protection from the perspective of
international relations, most notably Suhrke (1998) and Betts (2003; 2009), has therefore
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classified a global asylum safety net as a ‘global public good’.

C. The Weakening International Refugee Regime
Since not long after the start of the modern international order, the international community
has had a multilateral framework to provide asylum to international forced migrants. This
multilateral framework is known as the international refugee regime. This regime, by now
over 75 years old, continues to govern the relations and burdens of states towards one another
in the provision of asylum, as well as the rights of international forced migrants who request
asylum or whose request for asylum has been accepted. Its provisions and content therefore
matter.

i. The International Refugee Regime
The modern international refugee regime is an outcome of the Second World War. In the
aftermath of that war, European states had to deal with millions of displaced foreign persons
scattered across their borders by the incessant fighting. They quickly recognized that their
interests would best be served through a multilateral agreement on the provision of asylum
and repatriation.
After a first attempt to offer services to displaced persons collapsed under the weight of Cold
War political tensions, the United Nations General Assembly in December 1949 agreed to the
creation of the temporary office of United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR)32. UNHCR received a dual mandate: to ensure forced migrants access to
protection, and to seek permanent (durable) solutions for their condition33. Wary of the
previous failed attempt to provide relief, UNHCR was explicitly established as a non-political
institution, which meant in practice that it would only be allowed to work in a country upon
invitation from its host government. In addition, its operations would have to be funded from
voluntary donations.
Simultaneous to the establishment of this temporary multilateral organization, a select
working group of United Nations member-states also set out to clarify the rights of migrants
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who would be supported by the international community. Their final document, the 1951
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (the Refugee Convention), consolidated
existing Inter-War multilateral agreements on asylum, and developed a common set of
standards by which displaced foreigners should be treated.
The 1951 Refugee Convention forms the basis of the modern global asylum safety net,
commonly referred to as the international refugee regime34. It regulates who has the right to
request asylum, and what rights asylum-seekers and refugees (persons whose claim to asylum
has been recognized as valid) should have. Article 1(a)2 provides the standard definition for
persons eligible to refugee status as:

“a person who, owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for
reasons of race, religion, nationality, or membership of a particular social
group or political opinion, is outside of country of his nationality and is
unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that
country”35.
Article 33 of the Refugee Convention prohibits the return of any person who is classified as a
refugee to a country where they might risk persecution. This return prohibition – known as
non-refoulement – overrules the traditional sovereign right of a country to deny foreigners
entry into their country. It is a core principle of the international refugee regime and is now
widely seen as jus cogens customary international law (Lauterpacht and Bethlehem 2003).
Refugees who receive protection have two additional needs: social and legal rights to help
them live in their surrogate state, and a timely resolution to their predicament. The Refugee
Convention only mentions the first. In order to help refugees adapt and live in their place of
refuge, it defines a list of the socio-economic rights they should receive – including access to
national courts, the right to employment and education. The Convention does not provide
clear guidance on how a permanent resolution to refugee crises should be found. Despite this
silence, the ability to resolve refugee crises is indispensable for the successful functioning of
the refugee regime. A timely resolution is necessary to maintain state support for the
34
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provision of asylum in their borders, and to help forced migrants move on with their lives.
Literature on asylum policies traditionally identifies three possible ‘durable’ solutions: a
return to the country of origin (repatriation), the assimilation of the forced migrant in the host
state population (local integration), or the integration of the forced migrant in a third state
(resettlement)36.
Together, UNHCR and the 1951 Refugee Convention form the basis of the modern
international refugee regime. Since then, the treaty stipulations of the 1951 Convention have
only been updated once, in 1967. When negotiating the original treaty, states were hesitant to
set too much of a precedent and agreed to limit the application of the refugee regime to
persons displaced by events in Europe which had occurred before 1 January 195137. However,
as the Cold War, independence and post-independence wars saw conflict erupt throughout the
developing world in the 1950s and 1960s, UNHCR opted to expand its operations beyond
Europe. After a successful lobby, most 1951 Convention signatories agreed to formalize this
expansion in 1967 and to this end signed the New York Protocol38. The New York Protocol
removed all geographical and chronological restrictions in the convention, making its
provisions applicable globally. The 1967 New York Protocol is an important reason why the
international refugee regime continues to be relevant today
The 1951 Convention mandated UNHCR to monitor and support state compliance with the
standards of the Convention. Since 1951, UNHCR has therefore advocated for state adherence
the Refugee Convention, and lobbied for a strengthening and expansion of the refugee
regime. Through a mixture of persuasion, socialization, and material incentives, the institution
has communicated the importance of refugee norms, and convinced many new states that the
benefits of participating in the refugee regime outweigh the costs of ‘going it alone’39. At
present, 145 nations have committed themselves to the international refugee regime, with the
few hold-outs concentrated in the Gulf and Levant, South Asia and parts of South-East Asia.
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Except for Turkey and Madagascar, all signatories of the 1951 Convention have also ratified
the 1967 Convention.
Since 1967, international refugee treaty law has not been further updated on a global level.
The framework of the refugee regime has therefore not changed since then, although the way
in which states apply its provisions has evolved. The international refugee regime is not a
static entity. State perspectives of refugee management and UNHCR’s role in the regime have
changed over time, and as they change the implementation and interpretation of the refugee
regime have also changed. Most important for this process is the UNHCR ‘Executive
Committee’ (ExCom), composed of interested state parties, which meets annually to produce
‘soft law’ consensus on the future of the refugee regime. While these ‘ExCom’ conclusions
carry authoritative weight, they are not binding on states which are party to the Convention40.

ii. The Weakening Refugee Regime
While the New York Protocol therefore ensured the continued relevance of the international
refugee regime into the 21st century, the modern international refugee regime has over the past
three decades become increasingly contested. States have become ever-more sensitive to the
asylum burdens which they carry, and increasingly unwilling to carry those burdens. The
power and influence of the refugee regime have declined as migration and displacement
dynamics have changed, state adherence to the implementation of the refugee regime
provisions has steadily eroded, and other migration consultative processes (e.g. the Khartoum
Process and Barcelona Process) have proliferated41.
Of special mention are also procedural deficits within the refugee regime itself, which have
become ever more apparent and problematic over time. Most of these weaknesses can be
traced back to the historical circumstances in which the Refugee Convention was written. The
original drafters of the refugee regime never intended it to be used as a manual to resolve
modern refugee crises. The authors of the Refugee Convention emphasized the particularity
of their convention by including explicit geographic and temporal limitations to its
application. The original Refugee Convention was written to resolve one specific refugee
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crisis – that of World War II refugees in Europe and in that one task, it proved remarkably
successful.
The procedural gaps in the 1951 Convention only became problematic when ‘mission creep’
set in and the Refugee Regime’s provisions were applied to very different refugee crises in
the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s. While the intentions behind an expansion of the Refugee
Convention were honorable and praiseworthy, the failure to recalibrate the Convention to deal
with the different nature of ongoing, non-European refugee crises meant that the 1967
expansion created an incomplete, limited refugee regime.
The procedural limitations and its consequences for burden-sharing in the present refugee
regime can be traced to at least three linked problems: (i) incomplete burden-sharing
arrangements, (ii) disparate refugee treatment, and (iii) refugee onward migration. These three
problems are among the best-known and most-discussed in refugee literature. Scholars have
identified and written about them for over thirty years. For example, Loescher and Monahan’s
edited volume (1989) includes chapters on ‘adapting to extra-convention refugees’
(Gordenker 1989), the need to cooperate to find durable solutions to long-standing refugee
crises (Cuny and Stein 1989), and the challenges posed by irregular migration (Gallagher
1989). Yet despite awareness about the incomplete nature of the refugee regime, all three
problems continue to in their own way shape the politics which occur within the refugee
regime
i. Incomplete Burden-Sharing Arrangements
Perhaps the most prominent omission in the 1951 Convention is the lack of a clear agreement
on how the asylum burden should be shared amongst states. As the original Convention
limited itself to past events, the original drafting delegations saw no need to negotiate a
permanent framework for the redistribution of refugees. In later conflicts, the importance of
burden-sharing arrangements became much more apparent, and how the asylum burden
should be shared between countries has become a point of serious contention - so much so
that it has undermined the efficacy of the entire refugee regime.
There are two types of burden-sharing possible in the refugee regime: asylum burden-sharing
and financial burden-sharing. The dynamics in both arrangements are somewhat different,
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although their game theoretical rationale is the same: to uphold the benefits of the collective
good (asylum) while minimizing personal investment.
Asylum Burden-Sharing Arrangements:
Asylum burden-sharing refers to the redistribution of asylum-seekers or verified refugees
from a state with a large asylum burden towards a state with a comparatively low asylum
burden. Asylum burden-sharing arrangements are important because they regulate the global
distribution of refugees. As conflict is not equally distributed across the world42, states in
more unstable neighborhoods are often forced to deal with a greater refugee burden by
‘accident of geography’43.
Refugee resettlement is the most prominent form of asylum-burden sharing in existence
today. However, resettlement is most often interpreted as a long-term ‘durable’ solution
which implies the integration of a refugee into their new host society. While a limited number
of Western states – foremost among them the United States - have provided resettlement
opportunities for refugees, the annual number of resettled refugees is rarely more than 1% of
the total refugee population44.
Temporary asylum burden-sharing arrangements, performed in the expectation that a resettled
refugee will return to their home country, do not exist. In practice, this means that the
overwhelming majority of migrants will remain in the country where they requested asylum.
The lack of temporary asylum burden-sharing measures, in combination with the geographic
concentration of refugee-producing states in the developing world, has made that developing
states provide asylum to the overwhelming majority of the world’s refugee population.
Indeed, 89% of the world’s refugees are hosted in developing countries45, with over half
hosted in just 10 countries46. In contrast, safe and wealthy Western states have seen much
lower ‘spontaneous’ asylum inflows.
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As far back as the 1970s, academics have debated about the need and potential to create more
equitable global asylum-sharing arrangements. Suggestions have included Grahl-Madsen’s
(1983) argument for asylum burden-sharing on the metric of ‘refugee per GNP’, as well as
Hathaway’s (1997) more elaborate suggestions for a reformulation of refugee law that
includes a global system of responsibility-sharing47. No academic proposals have not ever
been successfully translated into effective political action.
Financial Burden-Sharing Arrangements:
When states might not wish to support the international refugee regime by participating in an
asylum burden-sharing arrangement, they have the option to financially support states which
do host refugees on their territory. Again, there is no requirement for states to donate to the
refugee regime. As noted, UNHCR’s Statute requires the organization to depend on voluntary
donations to fund its work. Only the preamble to the 1951 Convention and UNHCR
Executive Committee (ExCom) Conclusion 85 of 1998 offer non-binding guidance on a more
equitable allocation of international responsibility for refugee protection48.
The lack of any clear guidance on how to finance the regime’s obligations has resulted in the
chronic underfunding of refugee needs. Over the past two decades, UNHCR has not once
attained its funding targets. In several cases, the organization has even been left struggling to
provide basic amenities during major refugee crises. For example, in 2015, the Syria refugee
crisis received only 62% of the funds it needed to help refugees attain their rights49 - a
percentage which was high compared with the funding levels of many other crises: refugee
support in South Sudan was only 28% funded50, support for refugees in the Democratic
Republic of Congo was only 32% funded51.
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ii. Disparate Refugee Treatment
An important consequence of incomplete burden-sharing arrangements has been to exasperate
already-existing differences in refugee treatment between developed and developing states.
Some of these differences are inevitable. Stronger social welfare structures and greater
financial means in developed states mean that they can offer more services to refugees who
live within their borders. However, these economic and institutional differences have been
exacerbated by a lack of burden-sharing.
Greater responsibility has therefore combined with poorer refugee provisions. Because of this
toxic combination, many developing states have been left unable to comply with their refugee
regime obligations by themselves. Refugee-hosting states have often shown remarkable
generosity in their welcome of refugees, but the sheer numbers involved in many crises can
overwhelm their limited government capacity and fragile economies – and can lead to friction
between host and refugee populations.
iii. Refugee Onward Migration
With such disparities in refugee treatment, it can hardly be a surprise that thousands of
refugees have risked often-dangerous journeys towards countries where they are more likely
to receive proper services and opportunities to rebuild their lives. As noted before, onward
migration towards Western nations has rapidly increased since the late 1970s. Asylum
applications in Western Europe rose from 20,000 in 1976 to 450,000 in 1990, and after a
period of stagnation and slow decline have since 2012 rapidly increasing to a record 1.3
million asylum applications in 2015 and 201652.
In the absence of asylum burden-sharing arrangements, one way of looking at onward
migration is therefore as an attempt by refugees to force their own redistribution from
countries less able to support them in their needs, towards countries which can support their
needs. In other words: refugees are responding to the absence of burden-sharing and their
poor future prospects in their states of residence by forcing their own relocation.
For refugees, spontaneous resettlement has proved to be a remarkably successful tactic. The
very lack of asylum burden-sharing arrangements means that states cannot return refugees to
52
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their original country of asylum, an oversight which migrants use to their advantage.
Nonetheless, refugee onward migration carries so many risks that it can hardly be considered
a solution to the problem of burden-sharing. Refugee onward migration is dangerous and
expensive, and therefore almost never an option for the poorest and most vulnerable refugees
who might be in greatest need of better services53.
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2. Conceptualising the Politics of the Incomplete
Refugee Regime:
Scholars from a wide variety of disciplines have devoted countless hours of study and offered
hundreds of suggestions to ‘right the ship’ and improve the refugee regime’s protection of
international justice and order. Given the focus of this paper on the state maneuvering to
support their interest in refugee burden-sharing arrangements, the below literature review
focuses on academic work which takes an international relations perspective of the refugee
regime.

A. The Refugee Regime in International Relations: A
Literature Review
The first academic work on the international politics of forced migration did not use
international relations theory, but were descriptive, strongly archival and empirical in nature.
Gordenker (1987) was the first to explain the twentieth-century political emergence of the
international refugee regime. Around the same time, an edited volume on Refugees in
International Relations by Loescher and Monahan (1989) offered the first multi-disciplinary
criticism of the weaknesses present in this international refugee regime. A decade later,
Loescher (2001) developed an in-depth institutional history of the intergovernmental
organization tasked to oversee the refugee regime: the United Nations High Commissioner of
Refugees.
The theoretical study of refugee regime politics can be divided into four phases, based on
their conceptualization of the subject of study: (i) early descriptive research on the
international relations of the refugee regime; (ii) the theoretical studies of politics in the
incomplete refugee regime from the perspective of the regime itself, which took off in the
early 2000s, (iii) studies about the refugee regime from the perspective of states, which
emerged in the early 2000s, and (iv) the expansion of the subject of study to include forced
migrants not normally considered refugees in the late 2000s.
The earliest expositions of the refugee regime that used International Relations theory
retained the individual refugee as the object of study. By the early 1990s ideas associated with
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the Copenhagen School offered new research avenues for refugee as well. Several scholars
attempted to re-conceptualize forced migration from the perspective of refugees themselves
by applying the ‘human’ security concept (Newman and van Selm 2003). Others examined
the empirical relationship between refugee movements and conflict. In response to
experiences in Somalia, Rwanda, and the former Yugoslavia, multiple scholars highlighted
that refugees are not only a consequence of conflict, but may also contribute to insecurity
(Loescher 1992, 1993; Weiner 1993, 1995; Stedman and Tanner 2003; Lischer 2005). By the
late 2000s, this ‘securitization of refugees’ literature led to the development of ‘spoilers’, a
term used to describe how forced migrants can become a barrier to peace-building initiatives
in post-conflict situations if they are not provided with adequate protection and durable
solutions (Morris and Stedman 2008; Milner 2009).
The theoretical study of the refugee regime as a regime would not take hold until the late
1990s. Most noteworthy was the work of the English School of International Relations, which
traced the origins of the global asylum regime to the Westphalian-Enlightenment implied
state-citizen-territory nexus which forms the foundation of the modern international order
(Skran 1995; Haddad 2008; Hurrell 2010). In addition, Loescher (2001), Loescher, Betts and
Milner (2008) and Betts (2013) examined the role of UNHCR in the maintenance of the
refugee regime. Their analysis would evolve over this decade of research under the influence
of a growing body of work building theory-informed analysis of state actions in the refugee
regime. Betts (2003) was the first to directly apply international relations theory to the refugee
regime, showing that asylum-evading states are more likely to offer burden-sharing support to
other countries if such support results in ‘joint-products’, i.e. public goods with additional
private benefits. Milner (2009) traced how countries in Southern Africa practice a ‘politics of
asylum’ to defend their perceived political interests. Greenhill (2010) used a realistconstructivist framework to show how forced migration has frequently become an instrument
of state foreign policy, with illiberal governments using ‘strategically engineered migration’
to impose costs on target states with the aim of influencing inter-state relations to their
benefit.
By the late 2000s, more structured research agendas into the international relations of forced
migration governance developed, focusing on using international relations theory (foremost
regime theory) to conceptualize the functioning of the refugee regime and the regulation of
forced migration (Loescher, Betts and Milner 2008; Betts 2010; Betts and Loescher 2010).
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This work built on the descriptive studies of the late 1980s in that both took the regime as
their level of analysis, took a liberal institutionalist perspective as their theoretical framework,
and placed special emphasis on the role of UNHCR in the functioning of the refugee regime.

B. Strengthening the Weakened Refugee Regime:
Why Has Burden-Sharing Remained So Elusive?
Beyond expositions describing the refugee regime in its entirety, a great many more focused
publications have taken on one or more of the specific problems which weaken the refugee
regime as their subject of study. Notably, Hathaway and Neve (1997), Suhrke (1998), and
Betts (2009) have sought to understand why the procedural flaws of the refugee regime have
weakened state support for its provisions, and looked for ways to overcome the lack of
burden-sharing which occurs in the refugee regime.
In describing the problems and possible solutions to the dysfunction of the refugee regime,
these studies take a risk: the validity of their suggested improvements will depend on the
accuracy of their problem-analyses. A proper conceptualization of state politics in the refugee
regime is essential if we are to fully grasp the causes of the lack of burden-sharing in the
refugee regime and to formulate the correct solutions which will help overcome weakening
state adherence to the refugee regime. Studies of state burden-sharing in the refugee regime
are one area of study where a thorough understanding of states and state behavior in the
refugee regime matter greatly. To see why, it helps to briefly describe each of the three
mentioned studies.
a. Hathaway and Neve
Over the seven decades that the refugee regime now exists, a great many practical studies
have made a plurality of suggestions on how to strengthen the refugee regime. Perhaps the
most prominent practical study from a state-based perspective – and one of the few still
referenced today – was developed by Hathaway and Neve (1997).
As their report had a pragmatic focus, Hathaway and Neve do not conceptualize the politics of
the current refugee regime from an international relations perspective. The authors use
interviews with stakeholders and experts to identify two core problems of refugee regime
dysfunction. First, states increasingly consider the refugee regime an “uncontrolled back
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door” for permanent irregular migration because of the rise of the asylum-migration complex.
Second, a lack of proper burden-sharing agreements undermines the functioning the regime54.
In their analysis, the authors note: “the critical right of at-risk people to seek asylum will
survive only if the mechanisms of international refugee protection can be reconceived to
minimize conflict with the legitimate migration control objectives of states, and dependably
and equitably to share responsibilities and burdens”55. However, Hathaway and Neve’s
solutions to stabilize the refugee regime are foremost thought exercises of what states should
do to improve the refugee regime, but with comparatively little theorization of how states
currently practice politics in the refugee regime. To create a more equitable refugee regime,
Hathaway and Neve suggest a reform of the durable solutions framework so that refugees
must at some point return to their country of origin. Refugee protection should truly become a
temporary phenomenon, which would offer political room create a framework of “common
but differentiated” responsibilities amongst states in the refugee regime56.
The effectiveness of Hathaway and Neve’s solution rests on the assumption that “most
refugees will [eventually] be able to return home”57 but does not include a concrete solution
on how to achieve such a return. Given the growing number of refugees who remain stuck in
multi-decennial protracted refugee situations, the promise of temporary protection - and by
extension the practical viability of a ‘common but differentiated’ burden-sharing framework –
is undermined by the lack of a viable means to solve protracted refugee situations. In addition,
the lack of a clear theoretical explanation of why and how the refugee regime landed itself in
its current quagmire impedes the applicability of the report’s solutions.
b. Surhke: A Prisoner’s Dilemma
Astrid Suhrke (1998) was the first to conceptualize state behavior in the refugee regime using
international relations theory and Game Theory. Suhrke notes how previous practical
suggestions like Hathaway and Neve (1997) have all argued that a common refugee regime
burden-sharing mechanism might strengthen the international order and simultaneously
protect the rights of refugees58. These suggestions rested on the belief that a burden-sharing
mechanism would act as an insurance mechanism in which states accept a long-term limited
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asylum burden in return for the guarantee that they would not be left to shoulder a major
refugee flow alone59. Furthermore, a burden-sharing mechanism might assuage concerns that
developing countries, who have since the 1960s always shouldered the largest proportion of
the world’s refugees, might restrict their welcome to asylum-seekers60.
Suhrke goes on to note that attempts to overcome the burden-sharing impasse reflect attempts
to resolve an impasse that in game-theoretical terms reflects a ‘Prisoner’s Dilemma’. As
described above (see section I.B), the Prisoner’s Dilemma describes a situation where two
states, both better off if they cooperate to achieve a common result, may nonetheless refuse to
cooperate if their ideal outcome is the other party achieving the result without any
contribution from their side.
Many early papers which described the refugee regime as facing a collective action problem
would point to the success of solutions to similar collective action problems in areas like
defense (NATO) and environmental affairs to back up their claim that a burden-sharing
mechanism would strengthen the refugee regime. Yet Suhrke throws cold water on the
applicability of these successes for the burden-sharing in the refugee regime. She notes that
previous efforts to promote burden-sharing have had “very modest” results61, and expresses
skepticism about the chance for greater success in the future. To support this skepticism,
Suhrke argues that the refugee regime is markedly different from the security and
environmental regimes for three reasons: first, states do have the capacity to ward off refugee
‘threats’ with unilateral action (through border closures); second, the asylum regime only
addresses the symptoms of a crisis, and does not address the source of the crisis itself (namely
the reason why refugees are fleeing in the first place); and third, states are customarily
reluctant to commit themselves to pay for developments over which they have no control –
and in particular in matters of population intake62.
In addition, Suhrke offers two arguments against the use of sharing schemes altogether.
Almost prophetically, she argues that any successful sharing scheme, but in particular a
scheme with a long time-horizon, might encourage states to define refugee flows out of
existence by declaring them to foremost consist of ‘migrants’. Eastern European countries
have indeed used this argument during the 2015-6 refugee crisis as one justification for their
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opposition to burden-sharing in the European Union. Second, she argues that sharing schemes
are not simply expressions of fortuitously harmonized values, but are likely to become a
mechanism for states to fix their commitments to very low levels - institutionalizing a burdenshift among regions63. In fact, a restrictive dynamic might therefore occur irrespective of
whether states co-ordinate their asylum responses64. Without co-ordination, a ‘race to the
bottom’ is likely to ensue, whereby the temptation is to peg commitments at low admission
levels and restrict refugee rights.
c. Betts: A North-South Suasion Game
Alexander Betts (2009) agreed with Surhke (1998) that cooperation in the refugee system has
broken down, but used regime and global governance theory to argue that the dysfunction is
not simply a collective action problem, but the outcome of structural asymmetries in the
refugee burdens between developed and developing states.
For Betts, rich developed states have little incentive to cooperate as neither they nor their
immediate neighborhood is likely to become a refugee-producing region. In contrast, poorer
developing states are more likely to live in conflict-prone areas, suffer from poor border
controls, and have little choice but to cooperate but lack the money to provide proper care to
refugees.
Betts argued that this geographic imbalance alters the mechanisms necessary to overcome the
‘collective action’ problem of refugee burdens. For him, the refugee regime does not face a
‘Prisoner’s Dilemma’ but a ‘Suasion Game’, whereby the structural burden power imbalance
between developed and developing states has prevented the development of adequate burdensharing mechanisms. In a two-actor simulation of a Suasion Game, one privileged player with
a permanent advantage over a second player must be persuaded to cooperate, while the
weaker player has little choice but to cooperate; i.e. the stronger actor has little to gain and the
weaker actor has little to lose from any agreement. This undermines the prospects of
cooperation, but even when agreements are made Suasion Games will always only satisfy the
stronger actor and will always leave the weaker actor aggrieved65.
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Betts describes his suasion game analogy of the refugee regime as a ‘North-South’ impasse,
whereby ‘Southern’ developing states have little recourse other than to accept offers made by
developed ‘Northern’ states. In support of this description, he emphasizes four particular
features of the current regime. First, the prevalence of conflict and human rights-abusing
regimes in the developing world means that most of the world’s refugees come from and
remain in the so-called global ‘South’. Second, there is an institutional absence of binding
legal or normative frameworks for burden-sharing. Third, economically developed ‘Northern’
states have a very low interest in contributing to refugee protection for its own sake (although
they have been willing to offer earmarked contributions if they perceive other interests to be
involved, cf. Betts 2003). Lastly, the bargaining power of developing refugee-hosting
(‘Southern’) states in the refugee regime has been limited to threats that have been ineffective.

C. Limitations of the North-South typology:
As we saw in the introduction, Betts’ theoretical description of regime dysfunction in terms of
a ‘North-South’ terms does not quite seem capture the options and choices made by states
within the refugee regime. To understand why, it helps to first critique the four features on
which Betts rests his description.
a. Most Refugees Remain in the South (or do they?):
Betts’ first claim that that the world can be divided into an asylum-evading North and a
refugee-burdened South seem only partially compatible with real-world statistics. As he
himself admits, the use of the term ‘North-South’ in a refugee setting is to borrow a disputed
term in international development to describe a more complex reality in the refugee regime66.
Yes, 89% of refugees are hosted in the developing world, but to take this frame uncritically
results in inaccurate assumptions about how the refugee regime structures international
politics. In practice, the refugee regime is not so much divided between developed and
developing countries as between countries directly bordering on refugee situations and those
which do not. Refugees are not just foremost in the Global South. Refugees are foremost
contained near their country of origin. Just 10 countries host over half the world’s refugees67.
Of the 33 countries where UNHCR-registered refugees make up more than 0,5% of the
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population, 25 directly border refugee-producing countries. On the other hand, more than 90
countries host less than 1 refugee per 1,000 inhabitants. Countries with very low refugee
burdens include an eclectic mixture of nations from Central and South America, Eastern
Europe, Eastern Asia, the Middle East, and Africa. They include five major powers: the
United States and Japan in the Global North, Brazil, India, and China in the Global South.
Within the area often included in the Global South, they include the entire Gulf Cooperation
Council, nearly all of South America, Indonesia and Nigeria but also Mozambique, Sierra
Leone, Angola, Gabon, and Malawi68.

b. The Lack of Institutional Burden-Sharing in the Refugee Regime (is that is necessarily a
bad thing?):
In response, one might argue that per capita statistics alone do not do justice to state
obligations, for example because they leave out issues of political and economic power.
Wealthier, more powerful countries like the United States and China have a greater obligation
to host refugees than Nigeria does.
Such an argument zooms in on Alexander Betts’ second claim: the concentration of refugee
burdens in just a few states is a problem because of a lack of institutionalized burden-sharing
in the refugee regime. At first sight, this is a straightforward, common-sense argument with a
common-sense solution: create a burden-sharing arrangement. However, creating an accurate
burden-sharing arrangement that takes into account Suhrke’s (1998) explanation of the
limitations of institutionalized burden-sharing is exceptionally complex. Any burden-sharing
will need mechanisms to discourage states from redefining refugee flows out of existence by
declaring them to be ‘migrants’, and needs to dis-incentivize state attempts to fix any
institutionalized refugee commitments at very low levels69.
In fact, there is evidence that both these regime-undermining behaviors already occur on a
regional level where attempts have been made to establish burden-sharing mechanisms. As
noted, Eastern European countries continue to block implementation of a redistribution
mechanism for refugees because they consider them unwanted migrants. Even the acceptance
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rate of asylum-seekers who arrive spontaneously at the borders of these countries are
significantly lower than acceptance rates of asylum-seekers in nearby Germany and Sweden70.
This evidence does not necessarily mean that the institutionalization of burden-sharing is a
mistake. There is clearly a lack of burden-sharing by states which are not close to a refugee
source country. However, any institutionalization of burden-sharing that does occur, will only
work if the agreement is shaped to be highly flexible. As both Betts and Suhrke suggest, a
‘routinized response’ plan is more likely to sustainably improve state cooperation in the
refugee regime than a hard-wired explicit obligation for states to take up recognized refugees
from crises far from their borders.

c. Developed countries have a very low interest in contributing to refugee protection for its
own sake (but are developing countries any more willing?)
Third, Betts argues that Northern ‘developed’ states have a very low interest in contributing to
refugee protection for its own sake71. The figures support this observation, but they also make
clear that the lack of interest goes far beyond ‘Northern’ states 72. It is hard to find a state that
has taken a truly altruistic interest and supported the refugee regime through asylum and
financial burden-sharing. At best, some countries have been moved to offer support when
problems in refugee-hosting countries have had spillover effects on their interests73.
In fact, it is easier to inverse our discussion. Statistically speaking, especially North European
asylum-evasive behavior is not an anomaly in the refugee regime, but its involvement is. The
only countries not bordering a refugee crisis but listed in the top-30 of largest refugee-hosting
countries in the world are in ‘Northern’ Europe: Sweden, Norway, Switzerland, and Austria.
The GCC is among the wealthiest areas in the world but hosts relatively little Syrian refugees.
None of the powers outside Europe fully pull their weight in asylum affairs – although the
United States and Japan come closest.
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Some major powers with little asylum burden-sharing do make up for it with significant
financial contributions, but most of the top-10 donors to UNHCR in 2016 were countries from
Western Europe. The United States gave more than USD 1.5 billion to UNHCR in 2016 and
Japan donated more than USD 160 million in 2016, but financial contributions by other
asylum-evading major powers are paltry: the Chinese government offered less than USD 3
million support, Saudi Arabia paid only USD 14.5 million, and Portugal (which also does not
host many refugees) donated less than USD 400,000 to UNHCR in 201674.
An analysis of financial and asylum burden-sharing in practice therefore do not so much
indicate a North-South impasse as much as major intra-regional differences between asylumevading and refugee-hosting countries. Within the European Union between Northern and
Eastern European countries, within the Middle East between the GCC and Syria’s other
neighbors, and within Africa between East-Central and more Western and Southern African
nations. Political maneuvering during times of crisis also reflect and often reinforce these
differences. For example, attempts to form a common internal asylum redistribution
mechanism in the European Union are supported both Southern and Northern European
countries, but blocked by Eastern European countries. In the Middle East, all of Syria’s
neighbors except for the GCC countries have taken up multiple hundreds of thousands of
refugees.
d. Developing Countries lack means to Bargaining Power (or do they?)
Building on the previously discussed three claims, Betts argues that North-South discussions
are often stuck in a Suasion Game because developing refugee-hosting states are ‘frequently
faced with either accepting whatever is on offer or harming themselves by rejecting a
relatively small contribution from the North75. Betts bases his argument on the analysis that
attempts by burden-reducing states to increase their bargaining power through noncommitment to asylum norms have proven ineffective76. In fact, as we will see, states which
host major refugee populations and are looking to reduce their refugee burdens do have
multiple highly effective means to reduce their refugee burdens – and even to pressure states
which refuse to share in their refugee burden.

74

UNHCR (2017). Donor Ranking 2016. As found online at:
http://reporting.unhcr.org/sites/default/files//donor_ranking/2016%20-%20UNHCR%20Donor%20Ranking.pdf
75
Betts (2009), p. 32
76
Betts (2009), p. 35-6

36

However, even if states which host refugees do have options to retaliate, the statistics remain
clear that there is an impasse between states bordering refugee source countries and those
further away from crisis countries. Clearly, the lack of burden-sharing has led to a great
mismatch in the support of refugee-hosting countries by both developed and developing
countries. There is not necessarily an impasse between ‘Northern’ and ‘Southern’ countries,
but there is clearly an impasse between countries hosting large refugee burdens and those not
hosting large refugee burdens.
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3. Between Asylum Evasion and Burden
Reduction: Conceptualising State Politics With the
Refugee as Reference Point
The previously described nuances significantly weaken Betts’ claim that the politics of the
refugee regime should be described in geographic ‘North vs. South’ terms. The statistics
indicate that nearly all states – in the geographic ‘North’ and the geographic ‘South’ - have
quite successfully sought to minimize their asylum burdens, leaving a comparatively few
states bordering refugee crises to bear the brunt of the refugee burden. Neither ‘Northern’ nor
‘Southern’ states have shown much interest to adequately support the cost of hosting refugees
in the region near their home-country.
The statistics therefore indicate that refugee regime politics are not foremost based on the
state’s geographic location. A more useful alternative could be to analyse refugee burdensharing politics on the physical location of the refugee. Like Betts’ North-South explanation,
a justification for theorizing state politics based on the geographic position of the refugee is
based on four features of having a refugee regime. First, once a person migrates outside their
home state and has applied for asylum, international law at least temporarily gives them rights
and prevents their forced return home (non-refoulement). Second, the obligations imposed by
the refugee regime foremost apply to the state hosting a refugee absent institutional burdensharing politics. If a refugee is not physically on the territory of a state, the refugee is legally
not their immediate concern. Third, decision-makers wish to expend as little political, social
and financial capital as possible to host refugee burdens. Most often (but not always) this
means that they wish to minimize their refugee burdens. Fourth, as refugees are only hosted
by one country at a time, states are therefore locked in a zero-sum competition to minimize
their refugee burdens. This competition involves one of two positions, depending on the
physical location of the refugee: for refugees who have not yet arrived, central decisionmakers can apply maneuvers and legislation to evade or complicate their arrival and stay. If
the refugee is present on the territory of the state, central decision-makers can attempt to
reduce refugee burden by encouraging return or onward migration.
State asylum-evasive and burden-reducing strategies are therefore in competition with each
other for every individual refugee, but state apparatuses can implement both asylum-evasive
38

strategies to reduce new refugee inflows and burden-reducing tactics to reduce the impact of
existing refugee populations. The combination of asylum-evasive and refugee-reducing
strategies shape political maneuvering in burden-sharing affairs in the international refugee
regime.
Developing a more accurate definition of the impasse in the refugee regime is about more
than just semantics. Shedding all appearance that politics in the refugee regime is foremost
defined by geographic or economic difference creates room for new understandings and
questioning of politics in the refugee regime. Basing our discussion on two possible asylumevasive or burden-reducing strategies instead of geographic references recognizes that
developing and developed states have a vast palette of options to defend their strategic
interests, and offers a more flexible rationale for when states are likely to employ different
tactics.
The following discussion seeks to offer a more complete description of the burden-sharing
politics of the refugee regime in four parts: section A describes the main strategies which
states use to evade their asylum burdens. It is complemented by section B, which describes
strategies used by states which host refugee populations to reduce existing refugee burdens.
Section C describes several strategies pursued by states to limit the access of potential
asylum-seekers to the rights of the refugee regime altogether. Finally, section D argues that
the reorientation of focus from the state to the refugee results in a markedly different
appreciation of politics in the refugee regime: not one limited by a ‘North’ vs. ‘South’
impasse, but a regime better characterized as a zero-sum political game between all states.

A. Asylum-Evasion Politics in the Incomplete Refugee
Regime Complex:
Most countries in the world do not carry a significant refugee burden, but have nonetheless
developed policies to evade potential future asylum burdens. For example, over 40 states have
erected border walls to counter irregular migration flows since the beginning of this century77.
Yet, while very visible, border walls have not been the most effective deterrent to irregular
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migration. They are the nuclear option by which a country effectively opts to ignore the nonrefoulement requirement and refugee status determination procedures of the refugee regime.
Much more effective for asylum-evasive politics in the refugee regime have been less visible
institutional changes to complicate both the ability and legitimacy of asylum applications.
These changes have included burden-shifting asylum responsibilities away from themselves
within the refugee regime itself, as well as attempts to regime-shifting and forum-shop
asylum-seekers towards regimes which overlap with but do not offer the same protections as
the refugee regime.
Institutional innovations to evade refugee burdens been especially effective when they have
taken advantage of the weakening refugee regime. Three tactics to evade asylum-seekers
stand out: (i) the securitization of the travel regime; (ii) burden-shifting asylum responsibility
through the conceptualization of ‘safe countries of asylum’; and (iii) by limiting financial
contributions in the refugee regime. Let’s briefly discuss each tactic.

a. Securitizing the Travel Regime to evade spontaneous arrival asylum
The securitization of the international travel regime has made it exceptionally more difficult
to seek asylum through legal migration. Developed states have taken advantage of increased
regulation of the travel regime to ‘regime shift’ spontaneous asylum arrivals from the refugee
regime towards travel regime. They have banned the possibility to request asylum at their
embassies and refuse visas to people who express their need for asylum during embassy
interviews. In addition, they have put into place ‘carrier sanctions’ - fines on airline carriers
who enable irregular migrants to reach Europe by air78. While European countries started the
practice of securitized travel, its use has rapidly spread as many developing countries have to varying degrees - also sought to tighten their entry and exit controls.
By securitizing the travel regime in this manner, states geographically further removed from
refugee crises have been able to achieve a net reduction in asylum-seekers’ access to
spontaneous arrival asylum. As Betts (2010) notes this ‘bypass without overtly violating the
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provisions of the refugee regime’ has thus implicitly renegotiated the distribution of
responsibilities for refugee care to the states geographically proximate to refugee crises79.

b. Burden-Shifting within the Regime: Safe Countries of Asylum
Beyond attempts to complicate the spontaneous arrival of asylum-seekers, states have also
looked for justifications to dispose of refugees who do make it to their territory. As Suhrke
(1998) already noted, asylum-evasive behavior can also occur within the refugee regime,
notably if states simply declare arriving refugees to be ‘migrants’80. However, to redefine
refugees as migrants without offering them any recourse to the provisions of the refugee
regime would be the institutional equivalent of a border wall - de facto ending the refugee
regime in its entirety. Wishing to keep some of the refugee regime intact, developed states
have used a developed subtle strategy instead: the ‘safe countries of asylum’ principle.
The ‘safe country of asylum’ concept has been a topic of discussion by member-states of the
refugee regime since as early as the late 1970s81. Article 31(1) of the Refugee Convention
offers room for this evolution of the regime, as it only prohibits the imposition of migration
penalties on asylum-seekers and refugees when they arrive “directly from a territory where
their life or freedom was threatened”82 (emphasis added). The Refugee Convention offers no
guidance on how to deal with refugees who have passed through territories where their life
and/or freedom is not directly threatened. Refugees who practice onward movement can
therefore – in theory – be returned to another country where they had already have – or could
have – requested asylum.
The lack of clear burden-sharing provisions allows states which host major refugee burden the
opportunity to reduce their refugee population by pushing them to move onwards. The ‘safe
country of asylum’ principle seeks to upend this practice by arranging for refugees to be
returned to the first country where they can and therefore ‘should’ request asylum. If
completely implemented, it would institutionalize the existing lack of burden-sharing in the
refugee regime, and leave states nearest any refugee crisis to face the brunt of (if not the
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entire) refugee crisis themselves. In practice, implementation of ‘safe country of asylum’
concept has proven complicated and controversial.
The UNHCR Executive Committee first defined a clear set of conditions under which ‘safe
country of asylum’ procedures could be implemented in 198983. European countries lobbied
for the adoption of this conclusion, and rapidly adapted it into their regional legislation
because of worries about the impact of the Schengen Zone on different European asylum
cultures. While border controls had originally left each individual country responsible for the
deterrence of irregular onward migration attempts, the creation of an internal border-free
Schengen Zone meant that simple deterrence of onward migration through border checks
would no longer be possible. European Union leaders therefore established two prominent
‘safe country’ regulations to deter refugee onward movement: the ‘safe first country of
asylum’ and the ‘safe third country of asylum’ principles. Their contents were slightly
different. One was directed at the distribution of asylum-seekers and refugees within the
European Union, the second directed at the possibility of returning refugees to countries
outside the Union.
i. A Safe Country of First Asylum:
Asylum-seekers are aware of the stark differences in refugee treatment within Europe, and
have consistently opted to travel to the locations with more liberal refugee policies when able
to do so. The incentives for this practice – known as ‘asylum-shopping’ in European parlance
- are significant. For example, in the fourth quarter of 2016, less than 3% of asylum-seekers
were recognized as refugees or a subsidiary form of protection in Hungary, while 74% of
applicants in Sweden and 84% of applicants in Malta did receive protection84. Refugee care
also continues to see major discrepancies between countries: in Slovakia, accepted refugees
receive 40 eurocents daily pocket money and a one-off EUR 300 cash grant; in Germany, the
same refugee will receive around EUR 200 per month in cash benefits and a basic income of
around EUR 400 per month85.
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To prevent asylum-shopping within the Schengen Zone, Schengen member-states established
an internal ‘safe country of first asylum’ regime through the ‘Dublin’ regulation. The Dublin
regulations, first agreed to in the Dublin Convention of 199086 and updated in 2003 (Dublin
II) and 2013 (Dublin III), arranged that persons would be allocated to a country for asylum
processing based (in descending hierarchical order) on family considerations, to the recent
possession of a visa or residence permit in an EU member-state, to responsibility by the
country through which an irregular migrant entered the Union87.
However, the Dublin regulations have always been highly controversial within the EU for
both political and practical reasons. Politically, the shift of the asylum-burden away from
wealthy North-West Europe to countries on an external border has become a festering source
of frustration for Schengen Zone countries protecting the external borders of the European
Union88. Practical reasons against the Schengen Zone have focused on the dysfunction and
sub-par provisions of most Southern European asylum facilities. For example, human rights
organizations made multiple calls to suspend Dublin returns to Greece because of the
inadequate facilities and asylum processes there89, and in 2011 the European Court of Human
Rights blocked the return of an Afghan asylum-seeker from Belgium to Greece because of
inhumane conditions in Greek asylum centers90. Greece’s failing asylum system threw a
wrench in the ‘safe first country of asylum’ approach to asylum91. This wrench itself is also
both political: continuation of the administrative chaos can help “shield” the Greek
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government “from the possible mass return of failed asylum seekers from elsewhere in the
EU”92 who entered through its borders.
ii. A Safe Third Country of Asylum
Beyond the internal redistribution of asylum-seekers, Western states have sought to further
externalize asylum by establishing ‘safe third country’ agreements with states who are not
part of the European Union. Safe third country arrangements work along the same lines as the
Dublin Regulation, except that their implementation requires a bilateral agreement between
the EU and the counterpart state which must include several criteria that are not required in a
transfer under the Dublin regulation.
The most important additional criterion of safe third country of asylum returns is the need to
establish a “genuine connection” between the asylum-seeker and the third country. The
meaning of ‘genuine connection’ is contested. UNHCR, for example, has argued that ‘transit
migration’ or the mere opportunity to apply for asylum enough of a meaningful link to return
an asylum-seeker to a safe third country93. Nonetheless, international law leaves the decisionmaking power on such issues with states who partake in the agreement.
Use of the safe-third country provisions reflects a growing attempt by European countries to
institutionalize their geographic advantage evading asylum in the refugee regime. While the
safe third country notion is part of EU law under Article 38 of the Asylum Procedures
Directive, it is written down as a permissive provision - meaning that it allows states to
develop safe third-country agreements but does not require them to do so. The safe third
country notion was initially especially-used when dealing with asylum-seekers from Eastern
Europe and declined in relevance after their entry to the Dublin regime in 2004. In fact, by the
early 2010s only two countries were known to use the concept: the UK to handle asylum
claims from the US and Canada, and Spain on a case-by-case basis with claims from some
Latin-American and African states. Spain reportedly never used the safe-third country notion
the sole ground for inadmissibility or rejection94. The 2016 European Union Refugee Deal
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with Turkey reactivated the application of the third safe country of asylum principle95, and
there has since then been a political push to expand its use to other countries which lie on the
southern border of the European Union96.

c. The Benefits of Reduced Asylum Inflows: The minimization of Financial
Contributions
Insofar as these asylum-evasive measures have helped prevent asylum inflows in asylumevading states, the personal interest of states to contribute to refugee protection has also
declined. As noted before, asylum and financial burden-sharing are not included in the
provisions of the refugee regime. Only non-binding guidance on a more equitable allocation
of international responsibility for refugee protection exists97. Since states are not legally
obliged to fund the refugee burdens of other countries, most opted to not do so. UNHCR
operations have been chronically underfunded, to the point that budgetary issues as such have
become one of the organization’s never-ceasing discussion points. The voluntary nature of
UNHCR funding in combination with the unpredictability of refugee movements have
severely inhibited its ability to fulfil its mandate98.
Nonetheless, states sometimes do provide funding. Their reasons reflect the defense of their
private benefits. Roper and Barria (2010) – following Betts (2003) – describe funding for the
refugee regime as an “impure” public good, whereby states not only calculate their funding
based on their desire to free-ride the public good provision but also by additional private
benefits they might derive from funding support99. In other words: states provide funding
because they see a personal domestic or foreign interest which benefits if money is channeled
through the refugee regime. For example, Betts (2003) argues that European Union memberstates allocate their money within the refugee regime based on security concerns and
historical linkages with receiving countries – often their former colonies.
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States can make such specific demands of the refugee regime because of a practice called
‘earmarking’. Earmarking is a practice by which states specify where and/or how the donated
funds may be used. While earmarking allows states to increase accountability of refugee
regime expenditures, it also allows them to play politics with their funding. Two types of
earmarking exist: ‘tight’ earmarking, which involves specifying specific states and activities
where the donated funds should be spent, and ‘light’ earmarking which only specifies a
geographic region where the money should be spent. Over the past 20 years, over half the
funding received by UNHCR has been ‘tightly’ earmarked, and 20 to 30% has been ‘lightly’
earmarked.100 Only 15-20% of all received funding ‘unrestricted’, meaning it could be freely
spent where the organization saw the greatest need.
While earmarking is prominently used throughout the humanitarian system – and has become
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more common over the past two decades

- it carries one great weakness: it is highly

inflexible. The strings attached to funding which has been provided can actually undermine
the provision of international protection because ‘market failures’ in the allocation of
resources within and between refugee relief operations can still occur. Such failure is visible
throughout the modern refugee regime, where underfunding is omnipresent, but – in addition
- the level of underfunding can vary significantly between operations. Since the early 1980s,
the private benefits of states alone have not been enough to cover the funding needs of the
refugee regime. Funding levels remain far below requested levels throughout the MENA
region and sub-Saharan Africa. Reduced financial burden-sharing has inevitably had an
impact on the functioning of the regime in refugee-hosting countries. The Cold War was a
major strategic support factor for implicit burden-sharing in the refugee regime, as states
sought to maintain developing country alignment with – or at the very least not against –
Western influence, but its end ironically dealt a major blow to refugee financing, as the
perceived strategic need for international cooperation against an opposite ideological system
(capitalism/communism) declined. The collapse of the Soviet Union reduced the perceived
geopolitical significance of major international cooperation in developed countries102. The
changing strategic environment reduced the willingness of developed states to support the
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refugee populations in developing countries, a trend reinforced by the asylum-evasive
measures taken around the same time.

B. Reducing Burdens by Engineering Migration Flows
In so far as the refugee regime indeed carries the appearance of a North-South impasse, the
above description is not new. However, Betts (2009) suggestion that refugee-hosting
developing states lack bargaining power or means to retaliate to the asylum-evading actions
of developed states does not add up with the available evidence.
The next pages argue that major refugee-hosting states have two well-documented strategies
to minimize the costs associated with hosting refugees: (i) minimizing refugee services and
(ii) ‘encouraging’ or even enforcing asylum-seeker and/or refugee return. While the former
has been more discussed, the latter has been of greater political use. States have a significant
amount of (indirect) control over migration flows, and they can use this control to advance
their personal interest – to encourage refugee return and to encourage refugee onward
movement. ‘Controlled’ refugee flows can be used in support of a multitude of other
international interests. Refugees can be used to attract additional foreign funding and
investment. They can also be used to raise political pressure on target states in support of
other political aims.
These three tactics build on each other, and it helps to describe them in order from service
reductions, to ‘encouraged’ return, to ‘encouraged’ refugee onward migration.

a. Reducing the impact of refugees: between warehousing and urban refugee strategies
From the perspective of major refugee-hosting states, the collapse of the 1984 ICARA II
negotiations was an attempt by developed nations to evade their share of the asylum burden; a
retreat that fit in a wider pattern of Western retrenchment including declining official
development assistance budgets and structural adjustment programs. In combination with
environmental degradation, health scares, and high levels of unemployment, many developing
countries slowly dropped off into a wholesale systemic crisis. As governments struggled to
retain even basic service provisions for their own citizens, the economic and political
difficulties of the local population contrasted markedly with the alimentary, educational and
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health care services traditionally provided to refugees by the international community103. The
contrast offered fertile ground to central decision-makers for a crackdown on refugee rights.
Both developed and developing refugee-hosting countries have traditionally been hesitant to
provide refugees with access to their local labour markets or agricultural land. States worry
that competition between refugees and their own citizens for gainful employment may result
in social tensions, and are furthermore concerned that the provision of stable employment will
decrease the likelihood that refugees will return home104. With a few exceptions, refugee
access to labour markets is therefore “mediated by political and economic considerations”105,
and rarely provided with the clarity envisaged in the 1951 Convention. As a result, refugees
have traditionally been highly dependent on handouts for their survival.
However, handouts are often an expense so large as to be unsustainable over prolonged
periods of time. Developed and developing countries have therefore found several ways to
minimize costs – and by extension refugee services as well. Developed nations have managed
to minimize the impact of these costs by reorienting development aid from international
projects to cover costs associated made while supporting domestic refugee burdens. For
example, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) noted that
its member states had in 2016 spent 10.8% of their official development aid budgets to
support refugee care costs at home106.
Developing countries do not have the capacity to support refugees, and given their budgetary
dependence on international aid obviously also suffer from reductions in the availability of
OECD development aid budgets. Until the mid-2000s, limited financial support therefore led
many developing states to often ‘warehouse’ refugees in confined camps and settlements in
desolate areas in order to minimize costs and the risk of social tensions between refugees and
host populations. Warehousing is a practice in which refugees are held in camps “in
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protracted situations of restricted mobility, enforced idleness, and dependency—their lives on
indefinite hold—in violation of their basic rights under the 1951 UN Refugee Convention”107.
The practice, which grew as the number of protracted refugee situations grew from the late
1970s onwards, resulted in absolute despair amongst refugees who were forced to remain idle
and were completely dependent on international aid. Nonetheless, development agencies
supported the development of such camps, concerned that refugees might struggle to
otherwise survive given the legal obstacles to their earning a livelihood108. For much of the
late 1980s and 1990s, warehousing therefore became the de facto fourth durable solution for
protracted refugee crisis. By the early 2000s, the majority of recognized refugees then under
UNHCR care (7 of 12 million total) had languished in refugee camps for over a decade essentially imprisoned in an oft-terribly unfriendly natural and social environment with no
prospect for economic integration or development.
The abject living circumstances mobilized considerable pushback against warehousing
practices by the early 2000s, but did not inspire additional refugee funding from asylumevading countries. Instead, an ‘anti-warehousing’ campaign succeed in changing the focus of
refugee management from refugee care to self-reliance109, and by extension away from camps
towards urban refugee support. Because of the campaign, UNHCR’s policy towards urban
refugees made a 180-degree turn between 1997 and 2014: from effectively attempting to keep
refugees in camps110, to the promotion of urban refugee status through an ‘alternative to
camps’ policy111.
Yet even where this anti-warehousing campaign proved successful, reducing camp sizes and
encouraging refugees to instead settle with host populations, other restrictions have remained
in place. Refugees are still commonly forbidden from working, even though the money they

107

Smith (2004), p. 38
Smith (2004), p. 44
109
Crisp (2003b). UNHCR, refugee livelihoods and self-reliance: a brief history. As found online at:
http://www.unhcr.org/research/eval/3f978a894/unhcr-refugee-livelihoods-self-reliance-brief-history.html; also
see: UNHCR (2006). Self-Reliance Handbook. As found online at: http://www.unhcr.org/44bf3e252.html
110
Human Rights Watch (2002). Hidden in Plain View: Refugees Living Without Protection in Nairobi and
Kampala. As found online at: https://www.hrw.org/reports/2002/kenyugan/
111
UNHCR (2014). Alternative to Camps Policy. Geneva: UNHCR. As found online at:
http://www.unhcr.org/protection/statelessness/5422b8f09/unhcr-policy-alternatives-camps.html; for a broader
discussion on how this evolution occurred, also see: Crisp, J. (2015). Finding Space for Protection: An Inside
Account of the Evolution of UNHCR’s Urban Refugee Policy. Canada’s Journal on Refugees Vol 33(1). As
found online at: http://refuge.journals.yorku.ca/index.php/refuge/article/view/40451
108

49

receive from UNHCR is too little to survive. Children are often barred from attending public
schools, and as a result regularly work as child laborers to keep their families afloat112.
Urban refugee strategies in developing countries are therefore not necessarily an
improvement: refugees without rights, foremost among them the right to work, remain
particularly susceptible to abuse, extortion, and absolute poverty irrespective whether they
live in camps or cities. In addition, urban refugee strategies face a peculiar problem which
refugees do not face in camps: refugee suffering becomes a whole lot less visible in urban
settings, and it becomes quite easy for the problems of refugees to be drowned out amidst the
astounding misery present in urban slums throughout the developing world. In other words, it
offers a way for states to regime-shift refugees into the development regime.
Given the importance of media exposure to refugee burdens to push financial support from
the international community, an urban refugee strategy can therefore potentially be selfdefeating for refugee rights: refugees are hidden in cities where they are expected to make a
living at the same time as they are forbidden from working, are subject to abuse and
discrimination, and often lack full recourse to legal officials.
However, a regime-shift of refugees from the refugee regime into the wider development aid
regime offers major opportunities for all states to spend less money and attention on refugees.
In addition, the ‘disappearance’ of refugees into major urban conglomerations offers new
means for states ‘encourage’ refugee onward migration.
b. ‘Encouraging’ Repatriation and Onward Migration
There is significant evidence that states at times do forcibly repatriate refugees. Indeed, the
widely-supported notion that states can encourage or force refugees to return to the countries
from which they fled is the reason the principle of non-refoulement was included in the
original Refugee Convention in the first place..
While it has historically been suggested that proper burden-sharing arrangements can uphold
the refugee regime by preventing forcible repatriation of refugees, Suhrke (1998) already
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notes that the relationship between burden-sharing and refoulement shaky113. Of course, states
can forcibly repatriate refugees because of a lack of burden-sharing arrangements, but in
multiple other cases – for example during the mid-1990s Great Lakes crisis - more immediate
pressures and interests not related to the refugee regime have offered a better explanation why
states opted to refoul refugee populations.
Of course, refouling a refugee population is a drastic measure, and states with major refugee
populations have developed at least three strategies to ‘encourage’ the voluntary return home
of refugees focused on psychological instead of physical force: offering financial incentives,
impoverishing asylum conditions, and the aforementioned attempts to regime-shift refugees
into the humanitarian regime.
The most prominent incentives for voluntary return home have ranged from informing
refugees about the situation in the country of origin, to offering financial incentives to
asylum-seekers to return home. These tactics take advantage of the relative nature of the
terms ‘force’ and ‘voluntary’ by seeking to make return as attractive as possible even when
life in refugee-producing countries is less than stellar. Germany is one country which
prominently incentivizes return, having offered free plane tickets and grants of up to several
thousands euros to asylum-seekers who agree to return home114. While such programs have
had some success, they may unintentionally also make a country more attractive for newly
arriving irregular migrants primarily seeking to reach a developed nation to make a living.
More common and controversially, refugee-hosting countries have sought to ‘encourage’
asylum-seekers to ‘choose’ to return home by making asylum procedures and facilities as
uncomfortable as possible. For example, Whitaker (2008) describes how the Tanzanian
government in the early 2000s imposed restrictions and ration cuts on Burundian refugees
when donor states reduced their funding. This successfully caused the ‘spontaneous’
repatriation of over 30,000 Burundian refugees, who noted that living in Burundian
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persecution was better than in Tanzanian asylum115. More extreme forms of warehousing have
a similar aim, for example in Hungary, where refugees are being housed in containers,
ostensibly because they are a terrorist threat116.
Third, developing and developed states have sought to bypass the refugee regime nonrefoulement clause by regime-shifting refugees into the humanitarian regimes through the
creation of safe zones to which refugees can be ‘encouraged’ to return. While asylum-evading
states establish safe to discourage the outflow of new refugees, refugee-hosting states turn this
logic around by pushing for safe zones in order to return home refugees who are already on
their territory. In the past decade, Turkey and Lebanon have issued calls to establish safe
zones in Syria117, while the Kenyan government has (so far unsuccessfully) explored the
possibility of establishing safe zones in Somalia to encourage the return of refugees118.

c. States that Leverage Onward Refugee Movement: It’s rather common
If refugees can be ‘encouraged’ to repatriate themselves, they can also be directed onwards
towards third countries. States have at least two incentives to tolerate or facilitate onward
migration. First, the absence of institutional burden-sharing mechanisms in the refugee regime
offers states an opportunity to reduce their asylum burden by passing on costs associated with
asylum identification and refugee care. So long as no ‘safe country’ agreements have been
signed, refugees who leave a country are no longer its immediate concern. Second, if other
states object to the onward migration of refugees, the bargaining power of the states tolerating
onward migration flows in fact increases as these flows are incredibly difficult to halt other
than by provoking the collapse of the entire refugee regime. Given the limited ability of states
to halt irregular migration flows unilaterally, they must depend on – and therefore buy - the
cooperation of the state facilitating the onward migration119.

115

Whitaker (2008), p. 247-8
The Guardian (2017). Hungary to detain all asylum seekers in container camps. As found online at:
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/mar/07/-hungary-to-detain-all-asylum-seekers-in-container-camps
117
Reuters (2012). Turkey to keep pushing for UN-backed Syria safe zones. As found online at:
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-syria-crisis-zones-idUSBRE87U0VY20120831
Reuters (2017). Lebanese president calls for safe zones in Syria for refugees. As found online at:
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-aoun-idUSKBN15I1WQ
118
Human Rights Watch (2012). Kenya: Somalia Unsafe for Refugees to Return. As found online at:
https://www.hrw.org/news/2012/03/30/kenya-somalia-unsafe-refugees-return
119
Greenhill (2010), p. 30-1
116

52

Yet, unlike the ‘race to the bottom’ in quality of asylum care in developed countries, the idea
that states tolerate and even facilitate onward mixed migration flows remains somewhat
controversial in the academic literature. In the still-limited international relations literature on
the refugee regime, it is still too often assumed that developing states have only limited
control over their borders, and therefore limited bargaining power in the international refugee
system120. In contrast, wider international relations literature has noted the practice with less
controversy. For example, Myron Weiner (1983) already asserted that sending states in fact
exercise far more control over their out-migrations than might seem to be the case at first
sight, and can treat migration as a ‘national resource’ to be managed like any other121. Kelly
Greenhill (2010) built on the idea of international migration as a ‘national resource’ to offer
significant proof that many states do indeed regularly create and exploit of migration crises
for political purposes. Evaluating migration politics in the period 1953-2006, she shows that
states engineered migration crises at least 56 times to gain leverage over states both near and
far, and with remarkable success122.
If Greenhill’s tally of over one case per year seems excessive, it is in fact likely to be an
underrepresentation of how often states have engaged in coercive migration attempts.
Evidence for coercive migration is notoriously difficult to identify: on the one hand, states
that have been successfully targeted in the past are often reluctant to advertise events which
have transpired– even within their own foreign policy establishments. A state which admits
that it was the victim of a blackmail attempt, or worse that central decision-makers gave in to
a blackmail attempt, risks extensive scrutiny of its credibility and status in the domestic and
international affairs. On the other hand, would-be coercers can issue their threats and demands
in private. Those that do, often leave comparatively little written evidence of their actions123.
Sending states can politically leverage migration flows in one of three ways: by generating
migration flows, by escalating existing flows, or to leverage existing migration flows to their
advantage with e.g. threats. The most aggressive states actively create or threaten to create
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cross-border population movements and tie their actions to counterpart concessions to their
negotiating demands. More commonly, states have simply co-opted small-scale migrant
outflows into full-scale crises or have preferred to not play a direct role in the creation of
migration crises but to tolerate and exploit crises created by others for their own gain124.
Of course, facilitating irregular migration is not a science, and miscalculations can destabilize
not only the target state but also the state of origin. The persons employed to ‘incentivize’ the
onward migration by refugees or other migrants may be thugs or irregulars who lack
discipline and whose objectives differ from those of central decision-makers. Migrants and
refugees retain their autonomy to change their plans while traveling125, making longerdistance migration manipulation more difficult.
However, these difficulties do not change the base fact that states can and do control refugee
onward migration flows to a much greater extent than has been recognized in most previous
research on refugee regime politics, and many state have reason to accept the risk. Migration
engineering has proven an astonishingly successful technique for states to achieve their aims.
For example, irrespective if their demands were economic, political or ethnic, states who
engineered migration crises in the second half of the 20th century saw most all its demands
satisfied 57% of the time. If we include partial successes, more than 70% of all measured
engineered migration attempts resulted in a marked success for states who engineered
migration flows126. These figures are significantly higher than more widely established
coercion attempts, including economic sanctions and hegemonic coercive diplomacy (both
successful around 33% of the time)127.

c. Beyond the Refugee Regime itself: Using Regime
Complexity to Limit Access to Refugee Rights
Both states hosting refugees and states not hosting refugees therefore have access to – and at
different times employ – a wide variety of tactics to minimize their exposure to and maximize
the benefit of hosting refugees. However, state options do not end within the refugee regime.
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These asylum-evasive vs. burden-reducing strategies aim to help states to maximize their
advantage for the lack of burden-sharing in the refugee regime (observation 2 on p. 23 above).
Given the zero-sum nature of this struggle (observation 4), states have also developed a desire
to reduce access to the refugee regime altogether – taking advantage of the distinctly
international nature of the refugee regime (observation 1).
There is a whole category of possible strategies which states might undertake to further limit
unwanted refugee inflows – strategies which are of interest not based on the geographic
location of the refugee but the geographic location of the potential refugee.
The basis of these strategies is a geographic limitation in the Refugee Convention. Only
people who migrate outside their home state can apply for asylum. As refugee burdens have
risen since the late 1970s, there have therefore been growing attempts by states to limit the
need (and/or ability) of potential refugees to travel abroad to claim refugee status. The stakes,
and potential consequences of have been anything but trivial. At the end of 2015, UNHCR
counted a record 40.8 million persons forcibly displaced but still within the borders of their
home state – known internally displaced persons (IDPs)128. Many IDPs – who total are twice
as many as the total refugee worldwide population today - are asylum-seekers in all but
location: they have fled persecution in line with the Convention refugee definition, but they
have not yet crossed outside their country of origin.
To limit the access of these (potential) refugees to their rights, states have sought to ‘regimeshift’ refugees into different regimes where they have much fewer rights. This tactic has
become possible as a result of a peculiar feature that has appeared as the body of international
law has grown over the past seventy years, known as regime complexity.

a. Using Regime Complexity to Free Ride Treaty Obligations
Even if states no longer agree with a treaty’s fundamental provisions, they often prefer to
remain a party of the treaties to which they have signed up. However, remaining in a treaty is
not the same as supporting all treaty provisions. Instead of withdrawal, a state may attempt to
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enhance its perceived interests by shifting the meaning of legal provisions in a regime. This
process is known as regime-shifting, which results in so-called ‘regime complexity’.
As state interdependence has grown during the rapid globalization of the past half-century, so
have the number of bilateral and multilateral treaties which they have signed. By the
beginning of the 21st century, the UN registry counted more 40,000 international treaties
amongst states, including almost 3,000 multilateral treaties129. The growth of international
treaties has also resulted in an increase in the number provisions with conflicting
implications130. Such conflicts between regime provisions – known as ‘international regime
complexity’ - occur so-called in three types: ‘nested’, ‘partially overlapping’, and ‘parallel’
international regimes. Nested regimes are regimes embedded within larger regimes, for
example when a smaller group of states desires different or deeper cooperation than the
whole, and therefore create an additional agreement. Overlapping regimes exist where the
content in two agreements touches on the same topic and the agreements are not mutually
exclusive or subsidiary to another. This may occur when discussions on one topic give rise to
discussions on a related topic, creating spillover across treaties. Parallel regimes are regimes
which have no formal or direct substantive overlap. Nonetheless, they can be used to create
“strategic ambiguity” about how to interpret any single agreement, or create redundancies that
allow for continued cooperation should any single agreement fail131.
Conflicting legal provisions are not all too unique – they also regularly occur in national
legislation. Yet their impact is much greater on the international than on the domestic level.
To resolve conflicting legal provisions on the domestic level, states have established
processes of judicial review and parliaments may pass bills to reconcile such conflicts. In
contrast, the international state system is without sovereign (i.e. anarchic) and most
international treaties lack a clear arbiter to resolve disputes amongst participating states.
Regimes are not normally hierarchically ordered, and there is no default process to order
them. This lack of clear final arbiter to distinguish and clarify contradicting provisions in
different regimes threatens the “fragmentation” of international law: it reduces the clarity of a
legal obligation by introducing overlapping sets of legal rules and jurisdictions132.
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Without a sovereign to uphold and enforce international law, the international legal system
becomes a “chessboard”133 whereon states can attempt to make changes in any one regime in
order to influence the legal interpretations of other regimes. Such rearrangements occur
regularly, both intentionally and accidentally, and are an important part of international
regime politics.
The final ratification of an international agreement turns the incentives present during
international negotiations on its head. While domestic constituencies do not lose their power
over central decision-makers, and at times do change their mind, treaty ratification now leaves
the other participating states with a binary reaction to state disagreement: to stick with the
deal, or to reduce participation. They are unlikely to completely withdraw from the regime
given the previously discussed negative effects associated with such a drastic action.
Given the continuing strength of domestic power-brokers, central decision-makers will
maneuver in international politics with the goal of enhancing their domestic standing, and in
so far as possible pursue their own conception of the national interest in the international
context134; i.e. to move an international agreement closer to domestic wishes without the
regime fully collapsing. There will almost certainly be a desire for such maneuvering, given
that the varied – and at times competing - preferences expressed by domestic power-brokers
during the negotiations135.
To minimize the blowback and justify their political maneuvering, central decision-makers
can reduce perceived negative consequences of regime participation through targeted
international regime complexity. Regime complexity is an attempt to reinforce the advantage
of a participating states without erasing the gains offered by the regime itself, and is meant to
a subtle, stretched-out process.
Alter and Meunier (2009) identify three ways in which states can use regime complexity and
international law fragmentation to promote their interests: forum-shopping, regime-shifting,
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and strategic inconsistency. Forum shopping occurs when states select their preferred venue
or regime based on where they are best able to promote specific policy preferences, with the
goal of eliciting a decision that favors their interests. Regime shifting goes a step further, and
is political action with the aim of reshaping the global interpretation of rules. Finally, strategic
inconsistency occurs when contradictory rules are created in one parallel regime with the
intention of undermining another regime.

b. Complexity in the Refugee Regime:
Research on the influence of regime complexity on the refugee regime has remained limited
to a very few articles. Alexander Betts (2010) describes how regime complexity explains why
the refugee regime became entangled with at least five other regimes. Within the typology
laid out by Alter and Meunier (2009), these regimes can be classified as partially overlapping
regimes. Institutionally speaking, the incomplete refugee regime has therefore become
something of an incomplete “refugee regime complex”136, and while states have retained the
same interest they had before in the refugee regime – namely to minimize their overall
burdens – their strategies are not limited to the refugee regime but involve regime-shifting
between these five regimes.

The refugee regime complex. The above diagram illustrates the main actors and institutions in the global refugee
regime and how the regime exists in parallel to, and partly overlaps with, other mobility and non-mobility
regimes. Source: Betts (2010), p. 22
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The refugee regime complex offers states the ability to deter or reclassify refugees and
potential refugees in order to minimize their refugee burden. States do indeed forum-shop,
regime-shift, and at times even create strategic inconsistency to advance their strategic
interests on the international level.

c. Limiting Access by Regime-shifting Refugees into the Humanitarian Regime: IDPs,
the Internal Flight Alternative, and ‘Safe Zones’
Regime complexity has been used as a tool to legitimize burden-reducing strategies (for
example in the form of complementary protection) and asylum-evading strategies (in the form
of the securitized travel regime, which limits spontaneous asylum arrival). However, of
special interest to limiting refugee access to the refugee regime has been the rise of regimeshifting tactics towards the humanitarian and security regime.
Three related developments have made this limitation of refugee access to the refugee regime
possible: the development of a protection framework for ‘internally displaced persons’,
limitations on refugee access for persons who have an ‘internal flight alternative’, and a push
for the international community to intervene and created ‘safe zones’ where no internal flight
alternatives exist.
i. The Rise of ‘Internally Displaced Persons’:
The rapid rise of concepts like ‘internally displaced persons’, ‘internal flight alternative’, and
‘safe zones’ is not incidental. Their formulation in the mid-1980s came as states of all stripes
and types placed enormous pressure on UNHCR to find new durable solutions which would
be politically more feasible than the ‘local integration’ of or ‘resettlement’ of millions of
refugees. With two out of the three durable solutions considered off-limits, UNHCR was left
with a straightforward challenge on how to stabilize refugee-producing countries enough so as
to justify a return of refugees to their countries of origin. The identification of IDPs, internal
flight alternatives and ‘safe zones’ helped achieve this goal, and in the process offered room
to regime-shift (potential) refugees into the humanitarian regime.
As the number of irregular migrants and refugees grew in the 1980s, awareness also spread
that millions of ‘internally displaced’ persons were the refugees of the future in everything
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except location137. The breakdown of burden-sharing negotiations and growing mixed
migration flows fueled growing concern with IDPs as potential future refugees. Informationgathering was increased (the first statistics on IDPs were recorded in 1989), and more IDP
research performed by academics and practitioners in the course of the 1990s (cf. Davies
1998; Lee 1996, Deng and Cohen 1998). In 1992, the United Nations Secretary General set up
a Special Representative for IDPs, who coordinated the drafting and development of ‘Guiding
Principles on Internal Displacement’. The Guiding Principles, finally published in 1998,
offered the first standard definition of IDPs, defining them as:
“Persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their
homes or places of habitual residence, in particular because of or in order to avoid the
effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or
natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized
State border”138
Critically, this definition of the Guiding Principles was proclaimed a descriptive definition
only, i.e. not a legal definition. The IDP definition describes the factual situation of a person
being displaced within their country of habitual residence but is not a legal category which
offers IDPs special rights beyond the standard human rights already accorded by the standard
human rights treaties. Walter Kalin defended this arrangement, arguing that the application of
additional legal rights would not be necessary because IDPs continue to be able to rely on
their host state, while refugees are outside their own state and, unable to enjoy its protection,
require a special legal status139. Of course, this description ignores the practical needs of
many IDPs and despite much controversy, the UN Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC)
in 2005 developed an institutional framework for IDP protection within the humanitarian
framework.
The creation of a humanitarian framework for IDP protection has proven highly controversial.
Those in favour have argued that a framework offers access to protection for a category of
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people who previously lacked sufficient protection. Critics have countered that the IDP
protection framework might serve as a “migration control agenda”140. For example, Black
(2001) describes the IDP literature as an example of a literature co-opted by organisations
with “particular political or bureaucratic interests”141. Dubernet (2001) argued that displaced
persons command global attention when they threaten to overrun borders exactly because
states want to prevent them from doing so, and that the notion that states might support IDPs
out of the goodness of their heart is dispelled by the “indifference displayed in the early days
of [a refugee] crisis”142

Within this discussion, the growing number of internally displaced persons (growing from 4.2
million persons in 1992 to 37.5 million persons in 2015143) can be attributed to at least four
possible factors: there are simply growing numbers of IDPs as more crises affect more
people; the registration of IDPs has improved; IDPs are being better cared for at home,
reducing their incentive to become refugees; or external attempts at containing IDPs in their
home country are proving effective and have so reduced the pressure on the refugee regime. It
remains unclear what the role (if any) is of each of these four factors is in the rapid growth in
IDP numbers.

ii. Internal Flight Alternative:
The development of the IDP principle occurred as states started to apply greater scrutiny of
asylum applications in search of what would become known as the ‘internal flight alternative’
(IFA). The IFA test examines if a person might not be safe in part of their home country even
if they are indeed at risk of persecution in their home city or region. If relocation to a safe
region within the home country is possible, this is considered reason enough for a person to
not receive international protection144.
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The precise origins of the IFA test are unclear, although most sources trace the test back to
paragraph 91 of the 1979 UNHCR Handbook. The Handbook only articulates the IFA as a
negative, stating that: “a person will not be excluded from refugee status merely because he
could have sought refuge in another part of the same country, if under all the circumstances it
would not have been reasonable to expect him to do so”145. In practice, the internal flight
alternative concept was not part of policy or the academic debate until the 1980s, when the
rise in asylum applications pushed states to look for inventive means to reduce incoming
refugee flows. Hathaway and Foster (2003) trace the first IFA jurisprudence to a ruling by the
1983-4 German Higher Administrative Court, which established that a person could be denied
refugee status if they could relocate to an alternative safe region in their country of origin.
That ruling did not include the retrospective notion mentioned in the Handbook that persons
can still receive refugee status if they could not reasonably have reached that safety without
fleeing abroad.
Throughout the 1990s, court support for the IFA encouraged a significant increase in the
number of asylum rejections on IFA grounds146. Some of the rise could be attributed to the
growing number of persons seeking asylum from regionalized threats (including internal
armed conflicts) rather than monolithic aggressor states147. However, given the lack of rights
associated with IDP status, the IFA principle became one way for states to regime-shift
potential refugees from the refugee into the humanitarian regime148.
Both court analyses and UNHCR analyses of the IFA concept have evolved over time. By the
end of the century, UNHCR endorsed the IFA with the argument that the existence of an
internal flight alternative could be used as proof that the Refugee Convention’s ‘well-founded
fear’ criterion was not met149. The academic reaction to the IFA test was split. Multiple
authors argued that the 1951 Refugee Convention implied the value of the IFA test in the
formulation of the refugee definition, even if it did not state the IFA test outright. A person
would need international protection if it could not rely on the protection of its own state – or
as Shacknove (1985) put it: “refugees are, in essence, persons whose basic needs are
unprotected by their country of origin, who have no remaining recourse other than to seek
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international restitution of their needs, and who are so situated that international assistance is
possible” (emphasis added)150. In opposition, multiple authors that argued that refugee status
could not be lawfully denied simply because the asylum seeker ought first to have attempted
to flee within their own state151.
iii. Safe Zones:
It is, conceptually speaking, a small step from discussions on ‘internal flight alternatives’
towards the creation of safe zones in places where no natural internal flight alternatives can be
found152.
Safe zones have traditionally referred to a different concept: locations within a disputed
country or territory that are neutral or free of belligerent activity, and with secure access for
humanitarian relief153. These types of safe zones are centuries old, and through mediation by
the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) have become part of codified
humanitarian law: the first mention of safe zones in international law occurs in the 1949
Geneva Conventions, with further provisions described in the Additional Geneva Convention
Protocol I of 1977154. Despite their long legal history, very few safe zones in line with the
ICRC definition have been established because the demands for their creation are very high.
ICRC safe zones require the consent of all warring parties – who are often loathe to put
humanitarian priorities above their strategic priorities. Between 1930 and 1980, less than a
dozen such safe zones were actually established155.
Yet from the early 1990s onwards, the nature of safe zones changed. Global and regional
powers attempted to enforce ‘safe zones’ in developing world conflicts without requesting
consent from those who were party to the conflict. The evolution was driven by the changing
strategic nature of civil wars and the changing global balance of power. From the late 1980s
onwards, attempts at ethnic cleansing had become a tool of war in internal conflicts in Iraq,
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Bosnia and Rwanda, reflecting the longer-term trend in the evolution of war itself: at the
beginning of the 20th century, 90% of all war casualties had been military personnel; by its
end, 90% of all casualties were civilians156. A continued inability of great powers to push
conflicting parties towards peaceful resolution of their disagreements incentivized a search for
alternative means to protect local populations. However, the idea of imposing safe zones only
became politically feasible when the bipolar Cold War world order gave way to unipolar
American hegemony. Where great power intervention had often resulted in a great power
proxy war during the Cold War, United States (or U.S.-backed) interventions now had no
need to fear such pushback. Humanitarian intervention offered a way to protect local
populations. Obviously, this meant that safe zone would no longer have an exclusively
civilian and demilitarized character157.
Imposed safe zones also served important secondary political objectives of interested states.
Safe zones imposed externally can promote political aims under a humanitarian cloak158. This
happened, for example, when the West established a safe zone in Kurdistan in 1991 (which
weakened Saddam Hussein) and repeated this feat under UN Security Council-sanctioned
2011 intervention in Libya (which dealt a fatal blow to Khaddafi). Most of all, imposed safe
zones are logical culmination of attempts to contain refuges inside their own country159.
Imposed safe zones are a logical solution to three impassible features of the refugee regime:
the chronic inability to resolve crises in refugee-producing countries, the desire to reduce
pressure on the refugee regime, and the right to return rejected asylum-seekers to internal
flight alternative locations in their home country.
Both developed and developing nations have therefore argued for the use of safe zones to
‘protect’ refugees in their countries of origin. Ever since Thailand suggested to study the use
of safety zones for refugees or displaced persons as a way of lessening the burden for the
international community in 1985160, examples of such practices abound: the European powers
justified the creation of safe zones in Yugoslavia in the mid-1990s as a means to protect
internally displaced persons. Turkey has forcefully argued for safe zones in Iraq (1991, 2003)
and Syria (2012-present). East African governments have also pushed for safe zones,
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including Tanzania when discussing the Great Lakes crisis in the mid-2000s161, and Kenya as
a solution to the Somalia refugee crises162.
Yet the imposition of safe zones outside the parameters described by the ICRC has also
proven a devilishly difficult exercise. Multiple attempts to impose safe zones have resulted in
traumatic experiences – including during the Yugoslav Wars (notably at Srebrenica), but later
also in Sri Lanka (2009), and the Central African Republic (2014) have pushed a growing
resistance to the idea amongst academics in the past two decades163. Landgren (1995) already
argued for a return to the ICRC definition of negotiated safe zones, emphasizing that:
“The most basic of all refugee rights is the right to seek and be granted safety from
persecution...International protection of refugees encompasses more than bare 'safety'.
Safety, however, is the starting point, and the international community has been
cavalier with regard to the nature and duration of safety in some of the safe areas it has
created”164

D. Burden-Sharing Politics in the Refugee Regime as
a Zero-Sum Game
Regime complexity, asylum-evasive and burden-reducing strategies all share is a primary
interest in the geographic location of the (potential) refugee. They reflect that refugee regime
politics take place where the geographic location of a (potential) refugee intersects with
maneuvering by states to advance their perceived interests by participating in the refugee
regime.
This political maneuvering through which states seek to gain an advantage is not driven by a
specific geographic (‘North-South’) opposition but is better described using Alter and
Munier’s (2009) description of a political ‘chess game’165. As with a chess game, most of the
institutional techniques to evade or reduce refugee burdens are equally available to all states.
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In fact, typically ‘Northern’ countries have nearly all used burden-reducing tactics, while
many developing states have at varying times made use of the asylum-evasive tactics
described above.
Burden-shifting in the refugee regime is zero-sum: short of durable solutions or obstacles
preventing access to the refugee regime altogether, any reduction in the refugee population of
one state will mean an increase in the refugee population of another state. Given the high
social, political and financial stakes involved in refugee policies, strategies enacted by one
state are therefore likely to evoke a response by other states. In other words, state refugee
policy is not simply static or internal but also socially constructed in response to the actions of
other states in the refugee regime.
Of course, economics and geography do play a role in the exact strategy which states use to
evade asylum burdens and/or reduce their refugee burden. Economic prowess can offer a state
some advantages, for example the ability to reorient development assistance from other
countries to internal refugee-hosting processes. However, economic success can also put
states at a disadvantage – for example by making it more difficult to convince refugees that
onward migration would be more beneficial than staying in their receiving country. In
addition, the political maneuvering of some states is constrained by additional limitations
expressed in regional refugee law. For example, the strategy of rejecting refuge status based
on the existence of an ‘internal flight alternative’ is of little use to countries which have
signed the 1969 OAU Refugee Convention, as the OAU refugee definition explicitly covers
all refugees – including when the disturbance for which they fled occurred “in either part or
the whole country of origin or nationality”166.
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Shift Asylum-Seekers into the Humanitarian Regime

Table 1. Some of the respective asylum-evading and burden-reducing strategies available to states
seeking to advance their interest in the refugee regime
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Conclusion: From Bipolarity to Complexity to
Collapse?
This thesis has argued that the politics of burden-sharing in the refugee regime is best
explained by taking the geographic position of a (potential) refugee as its reference point.
This argument differs from previous work, most notably that of Alexander Betts (2009;
2010a; 2010b), which took the geographic position of the state as reference point to explain
burden-sharing politics in the refugee regime.
The shift from the reference point of the state to refugee has marked consequences in our
analysis of refugee regime politics. It allows for a more flexible analysis of state strategies
which are not fixed but have room to evolve. At the same time, it recognizes that states find
themselves in a zero-sum game to evade refugee burdens: in a world where durable solutions
have not kept up with the inflow of new asylum-seekers, every recognized refugee evaded by
one state will become the responsibility of another state. With multiple available strategies but
a shared goal of minimal refugee burdens, state maneuvering in the refugee regime therefore
represents a zero-sum political game where the gain of one state is the loss of a another state.
Theorising the refugee regime as a zero-sum game creates room for a much more thorough
understanding of state maneuvering, including actions that did not line up with a ‘North’ vs.
‘South’ typology. For example, it makes better sense of the choice by many Eastern
European states to employ typical burden-reducing techniques - including diminished service
provision levels, high rejection rates, and ‘encouraged’ onward refugee movement - to reduce
the number of asylum-seekers within their borders during the 2015-6 EU-Turkey refugee
crisis.
A theorization of burden-sharing in the refugee regime as a zero-sum game does more than
just contextualize state burden-sharing politics. It also re-emphasizes an altogether worrying
weakening of state adherence to the refugee regime. As a strategy, prolonged regime
complexity which has been visible over the past twenty years is like a chess player ignoring
the rules of the game. Just like prolonged, determined undermining of established game rules
will result in a cessation of any recreational game, so the prolonged use of regime complexity
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result in regime weakening – a process defined by Krasner (1983) as follows:
“If the principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures of a regime become
less coherent, or if actual practice is increasingly inconsistent with principles, norms,
rules, and procedures, then a regime has weakened.”167
The more gradual nature of regime weakening as opposed to regime collapse may look
different, but if pursued over a prolonged time is likely to have the same end-result: regime
failure. The obfuscation of regime weakening through regime complexity makes it not
unlikely for a formal regime to remain on the books even of the letter of its law is dead in
practice. As such, its greatest use will be as a tool to justify other attempts at regime
complexity, fueling further international law fragmentation.
It remains a question for further research how states can be incentivized to not undermine the
refugee regime through regime complexity. While it is clear that some innovation is
necessary in order to prevent the complete collapse of the refugee regime, it remains an
unanswered question what regime might incentivize state cooperation instead of their
detraction. However, refugee complexity amidst a refugee regime political ‘zero-sum game’
does offer one hint: any institutionalization of burden-sharing that does occur, will only work
if the agreement is shaped to be highly flexible. As both Betts and Suhrke already suggested,
a ‘routinized response’ plan is more likely to sustainably improve state cooperation in the
refugee regime than a hard-wired explicit obligation for states to take up recognized refugees.
Yet, irrespective of how such an adaptation of the current regime might look, one fact remains
clear: it is better to have a flawed refugee regime than no asylum safety net at all.
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